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NOTE
WHAT GOES UP MUST COME DOWN:
GROUNDING THE DIZZYING HEIGHT
OF VERTICAL MERGERS IN THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Does current antitrust theory suggest that closer scrutiny should be
applied to impede the recent avalanche of vertical mergers in the
entertainment industry, or should the antitrust laws be hospitable to those
mergers in deference to the Chicago School?
Part I of this Note briefly sketches antitrust theory and enforcement
over the past twenty-five years. Additionally, Part I discusses the
Chicago School approach and contrasts it with the views in recent
articles that suggest that vertical integration may be anticompetitive.
Finally, Part I deals with two seminal cases in the vertical antitrust
merger controversy: Brown Shoe and FordMotor.
Part II introduces the entertainment industry, where many of the
1995 vertical mergers have occurred, and explains some of the probable
short-rn and long-run impacts of these mergers. Next, Part II poses an
animated example of the effects of such mergers, then discusses which
antitrust theory best serves the goals of antitrust law in the area of
vertical mergers. In conclusion, this Note suggests that despite the
various utilities offered from previous theories about vertical mergers in
other industries, the proper approach to vertical mergers in the entertainment industry is to return to some of the fundamental principles of
Brown Shoe and Ford Motor, an approach necessitated by the unique
character of the inputs in the entertainment industry.
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ANTITRUST LAW AND VERTICAL MERGERS

A. Vertical Mergers
A "vertical merger" occurs when companies merge to increase
ownership of "preceding or succeeding productive processes" through
vertical integration. For example, if Chrysler, an automobile manufacturer, bought Goodyear, a producer of tires, that merger would be
considered a vertical merger. Furthermore, vertical mergers can be
defined more specifically as either "backward" or "forward." 2 A
backward vertical merger exists when a customer acquires a supplier.
Chrysler buying Goodyear is a backward vertical merger.3 Chrysler is
ensuring that it has a supply of tires at marginal cost.4 A forward
vertical merger exists when a supplier acquires a customer to ensure a
buyer for its product.' Goodyear buying Chrysler is an example of a
forward vertical merger.
In contrast to vertical mergers, horizontal mergers occur when
companies which produce the same end-product (and therefore compete
in the same product market) merge.6 Such would be the case if two
producers of cars such as Chrysler and Ford decided to merge. Moreover,
mergers may have both horizontal and vertical aspects. This dual effect
is more likely to occur with larger companies.
1. JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 177 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing the concept of
vertical integration); cf.ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 226-28 (1978) (stating that every company is vertically integrated to a degree and discussing
the historical differences between vertical growth and vertical merger).
2. For a good discussion of backward and forward integration, see F.M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 78 (2d ed. 1980).
3. For cases involving backward vertical mergers, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962); Scott PaperCo. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Hammermill
Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Engineering,
Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1969); and United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), revd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
4. Marginal cost simply measures the cost to a firm for the last unit of output. See SCHERER,
supra note 2, at 13-14. Ina perfectly competitive industry this would be equal to the price paid by
the consumer for that unit of output. See id.
5. For cases involving forward vertical mergers, see Paschallv. Kansas City Star Co., 727
F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1977); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); and Crown Zellerbach Corp.
v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
For a good discussion of backward and forward vertical integration, see SCHERER, supra note
2, at 78.
6. See BAIN, supra note 1, at 164-77.
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B. Recent History of Vertical Mergers
Prior to the late 1970s there was comprehensive enforcement of
restrictions on vertical mergers as exemplified by Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States7 and Ford Motor Co. v. United States,' and opponents of
the government stood little chance of victory in the court system.9
Thereafter, in part as a response to these and other landmark cases,
antitrust legal theory succumbed to, or at least was greatly influenced by,
the powerful new economic theories of the time, often characterized
under the rubric of the "Chicago School."'" As a result, there was a
significant rise in the number of mergers and acquisitions after the
Chicago School approach was utilized by the courts." Over the past
few years the number of vertical mergers in United States industries
steadily increased, reaching an all-time high in 1995.12 The Chicago

School theory's basic conclusion is that the majority of vertical mergers
are either pro-competitive or competitively neutral, and thus, because
these types of mergers supposedly result in higher efficiencies, 3 due in

7. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Brown Shoe was one of the first merger cases to appear before the
Supreme Court after § 7 of the Clayton Act was amended in 1950. See id. at 311. The amendment
made § 7 applicable to vertical and conglomerate mergers, as well as to mergers between actual
competitors. See id. at 317.
8. 405 U.S. 562 (1972). Both Brown Shoe and FordMotor are discussed in more detail later
in this Note. See discussion infra part I.F.
9. One account measures the Department of Justice's record before the Supreme Court
between 1953 and 1965 at 37 wins and 3 losses. See Richard Arnold, The Supreme Court and the
Antitrust Laws 1953-1967, 34 ANTTRUsT L.J.2,34 (1967); see also United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270,301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The sole consistency... is that in litigation
under §7, the Government always wins.").
10. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. It is worth noting here that
[o]ne of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts first began to adopt
an "economic approach" to antitrust problems in the relatively recent past-perhaps as
recently as the late 1970s. At most, this "revolution" in antitrust policy represented a
change in economic models. Since its inception, antitrust policy has been forged by
economic ideology.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOwA L. REV.
1019, 1019 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
11. See Appendix.
12. See Stephanie Strom, This Year's Wave ofMergersHeads Toward a Record, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1995, at Al.
13. However, there are those who wonder at the reality of long-run efficiencies for mergers.
See D. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, THE LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF MERGERS AND

TAKEOVERS 17-18 (1986) (finding "little support for the hypothesis that the average merger or
takeover yields significant improvements in efficiency and operating unit performance").
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part to "synergy,"' 14 generally they should go unchallenged by federal
antitrust enforcement agencies. But recently antitrust theorists have begun
to criticize the Chicago School approach because some analysts have
used the approach as a blanket justification for validating all vertical
mergers. t5 This body of critique has become known as the post-Chicago
approach. Generally speaking, the post-Chicago approach gives deference

to the Chicago School approach and its economic basis, but offers more
sophisticated and practical analyses, concluding that there are various
reasons why governmental agencies such as the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), and the Federal

Communications Commission ("FCC") may be justified in challenging
certain vertical mergers.
C. The Chicago School Approach
The decade following 1960 marked the modem height of antitrust
enforcement against vertical mergers.' 6 This period, marked by the
decisions in Brown Shoe and FordMotor, resulted in an almost per se
illegality of vertical mergers which even caused a small percentage of
foreclosure in market share. 7 In fact, a per se rule against certain
vertical resale restrictions was announced in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.' This disfavor of vertical activity was furthered by the
14. However, "synergy" has been questioned generally in all industries and specifically in the
entertainment industry. See Sallie Hofrneister, Better the 2nd Time Around?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1995, at DI; Alice Rawsthom, Searchfor a Happy Ending, FIN. TIME (London), Dec. 30, 1995,
at 6; Phillip L. Zweig, The Case Against Mergers, BuS. WK., Oct. 30, 1995, at 122. In addition,
other large companies such as AT&T have begun to retreat from the notion that greater efficiencies
can be gained through "synergy." See Steve Lohr, Going Against the Grain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1995, at Al.
Despite the skepticism of synergy in recent years, one important Supreme Court decision
regarding the tax implications of a corporate merger, found synergy a real enough asset to consider
it as a factor toward denying a corporation tax deductions for legal and consulting fees accompanying the merger, where synergy was claimed to be one of the goals of the merger. See INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 88 (1992). The Court held that synergy was real enough to be
required to be treated as a long-term benefit that needed to be capitalized into the value of the
corporation. See id. at 90.
15. See infra text accompanying note 24.
16. One commentator estimates that there were 27 federal antitrust complaints against vertical
mergers between 1960 and 1970. See Alan A. Fisher & Richard Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of
Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 6 R.s. L. & ECON. 1, 59 (1984).
17. See SCHERER, supra note 2, at 551. One author noted an appearance of per se illegality of
vertical mergers in a Supreme Court case from 1947. See BORK, supra note 1, at 225 (referring to
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947)).
18. 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (referring to situations where the seller attempts to "restrict the
territories or persons to whom the product may be transferred"), overruled in part by Continental
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1968 Merger Guidelines which prohibited vertical mergers that resulted
in the slightest increase in market share for those firms operating in a
concentrated market. 9 The main reason for the hostility toward vertical
mergers was the failure, or refusal, to apply neoclassical market

T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
19. See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (1968), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,101, at 20,521 [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines]. For a comparison with the U.S.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103,
at 20,551 [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines], see Ira M. Millstein, Report of the ABA Antitrust
Law Section Task Forceon the Antitrust Division of the U.S. DepartmentofJustice, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 735, 759 (1990) (finding, by comparison to the 1968 Merger Guidelines, that the 1984 Merger
Guidelines' "recognition of the relevance of foreign capacity, the recognition of an 'efficiencies'
defense, and a number of other changes suggest a greater tolerance of merger activity" and that
through "incorporat[ion] [of] a large number of non-market share variables into merger analysis"
there remained "a greater range of discretion in the Division than had previously been the case"
resulting in "fewer enforcement actions" (footnotes omitted)). See generally Note, An Economic
Analysis of the 1982 Justice Department Guidelinesfor HorizontalMergers, 67 MINN. L. REv. 749,
759-63 (1983) (discussing the 1968 Merger Guidelines and their effect on antitrust law).
The basic premise behind both the 1984 Merger Guidelines and 1968 Merger Guidelines was
that market concentration could lead to higher prices to consumers. Determination of market
concentration is arrived at by using the Hirfandahl-Hirschman Index ("HHr"). See id. at 763. The
HHI number is arrived at by squaring the percentage of market share from each firm and summing
those totals. See id. at 766. Thus, in a hypothetical market where there are four firms with equal
market shares, the formula would look like this: 252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 2500 HHI. See id. at 76571.
The 1984 Merger Guidelines characterize different HHI levels as follows:
below 1000 = unconcentrated
1000 - 1800 = moderately concentrated
above 1800 = highly concentrated
1984 Merger Guidelines, supra, at 20,560.
Thus, under the 1984 Merger Guidelines, while any merger creating a rise in concentration
above 1000 could be challenged, in reality it only would be where the degree of increase is
significant. However, any increase in concentration where concentration is already 1800+ likely will
be challenged. See id. at 20,561.
Also, where the post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800, any increase in concentration
over 100 results in a presumption of significant anticompetitive effects. Where the post-merger HHI
is above 1800, a merger that increases the HHI by more than 50 is presumed to create significant
anticompetitive effects. This presumption will rarely be overcome if the increase exceeds 200 and
the resulting HHI level exceeds 2500. See id.
However, despite these guidelines there has been little enforcement under the 1984 Merger
Guidelines, as compared to the 1968 Merger Guidelines. See Millstein, supra, at 760.
There is also special consideration given to "leading finns." Mergers presumptively create
or enhance market power if the proposed merger involves either a leading firm with a market share
of at least 35% and a firm with a market share of 1%or more; or a firm with a market share of 20%
or more and a new, innovative finm in a market or attempting to enter a market that is moderately
or highly concentrated, unless § 5.1 and/or § 5.3 show that such a merger will not lessen
competition. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra, at 20,561.
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efficiency theory2" to antitrust issues. The Chicago School posits that

applying this economic theory would result in most, if not all vertical
mergers being upheld as pro-competitive or competitively neutral.2 '
The application of the Chicago School's economic theory to antitrust
law marked a new era of antitrust philosophy in the courts.2 2 After a

decade of uncertainty concerning vertical mergers and restrictions
following Schwinn, the Supreme Court overruled the Schwinn per se rule
in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 23 signifying the coming
of age of the Chicago School.
The Chicago School approach maintains that if antitrust enforcement
is guided by the neoclassical market efficiency model, then most vertical
mergers should be allowed.2' This is based on the premise that the goal

of antitrust law should be to maximize economic efficiency.25 If overall
economic efficiency is maximized, then the consumer and producer are

20. This Note only explains the neoclassical efficiency model to the extent necessary to
facilitate a discussion of it in the context of antitrust enforcement. For a more in-depth discussion
of the model, see BORK, supra note 1, at 90-160.
21. See id. at 245; Note, supra note 19, at 761-62.
22. For a discussion of the Chicago School approach, see BORK, supranote 1, at 225-45. See
also Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of RestrictedDistribution:Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHt. L. REV. 6 (1981); Richard A. Posner, The ChicagoSchool of AntitrustAnalysis,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
For an early critique of the Chicago School approach, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985). The article concludes that the Chicago School
approach is faulty in two regards. First, it claims that shaping public policy based on notions of
efficiencies from the neoclassical market efficiency model is "naive." See id. at 284. Second, it
argues that the Chicago School approach is "too simple to account for or to predict business firm
behavior in the real world." Id.
23. 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (noting that vertical restrictions were not proven to have a
negative effect on competition or to have been lacking any redeeming value).
24. See BORK, supra note 1, at 245 (concluding that "antitrust should never object to the
verticality of any merger").
25. See id.at 90-91; see also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 11 (1959) (explaining that "desirable economic performance," one
of the goals of antitrust policy, can be achieved through "efficiency in the use of resources"); Robert
H. Bork, LegislativeIntent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26-31 (1966). But
see Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard,38
VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (1985) (stating that an economic efficiency standard is "untenable" in
that "it could never supply a satisfactory legal standard"); Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 249-52
(noting that the legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything resembling
a dominant concern for economic efficiency); Robert H. Lande, Chicago'sFalseFoundation:Wealth
Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989); cf.S. John
Goodwin, The Demise ofthe Intra-EnterpriseConspiracyDoctrine:Flexible Antitrust Enforcement
Policy Abandoned in a Maze of Economic Certainty-CooperweldCorp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984), 60 WASH. L. REv. 757 (1985) (concluding that courts should not
defer to any particular economic paradigm).
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equally well-off and thus, society is at an optimal point where there is no
need for antitrust enforcement. Overall economic efficiency has two basic
parts, productive efficiency and allocative efficiency.
Productive efficiency is the firm's ability to maximize its output
based on a minimal amount of input.26 For example, if Chrysler
produces a car priced at $20,000 with inputs costing $15,000, then
Chrysler's productive efficiency is greater than another car company that
produces the same car with inputs costing $16,000. The classical price
theory model says that the competitive market price will be near the
price charged by the least efficient firm-in other words, the firm that
has to sell its output at a price closest to its cost of input.27 Thus,
greater overall market efficiency will drive down the average cost per
unit. The justification for vertical integration through the Chicago School
approach is that firms will strive for productive efficiency by integrating
to a level that maximizes their productive efficiency, thereby lowering
the average cost to consumers.2 8
So, how should antitrust law react when Chrysler buys Goodyear
and thereby reduces its cost of input? The classical price theory model
would maintain, with regard to productive efficiency, that in this case
Chrysler will either cut its price and increase its market share or will
maintain its price and market share and reap greater profits. Under the
Chicago School approach this vertical merger need not be prevented
because the neoclassical economic efficiency model suggests that other
firms competing with Chrysler will copy the method of increasing
productive efficiency-i.e., buy their own tire manufacturer or start
making their own tires "in-house"--thereby driving down prices to a new
marginal level lower than the original marginal cost before Chrysler
bought Goodyear. Thus, in the end both the car manufacturers and the
consumers are better off. 9 Consequently, the Chicago School argues

26. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 237-38. Output is the final product that the firm either
distributes or sells. Inputs are the products and services used to create the output sold by the firm.
Inputs may include raw materials, energy, labor, or unfinished products to be finished and sold. In
the entertainment industry, for example, input could include actors, scripts, singers, or animation, and
output would be films, music CDs, or cartoons.
27. See BORK, supra note 1, at 92-98; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 8-18 (1976) (adopting the theory of monopoly).
28. See BORK, supra note 1, at 228 (noting that greater efficiencies through vertical mergers
could result in a lower input cost).

29. See generally Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integrationand the Sherman Act: the Legal History
of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CI. L. REv. 157 (1954) (dispelling the myths of the
economic dangers of vertical integrations).
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that productive efficiency should never be a basis for preventing a
vertical merger.
Allocative efficiency is a general type of efficiency which assesses
the welfare of society as a whole.3" If Chrysler bought Goodyear and
all affected people as a group were better off as compared to their
condition before the merger, then allocative efficiency would be
considered increased. How could anyone argue with this result?
However, rarely will all people affected by the merger be better off. For
example, with our Chrysler-Goodyear merger, perhaps there are resulting
layoffs in management or production, or perhaps the cost of a Goodyear
specialty tire increases because Chrysler does not use that type of tire. In
light of these very real possibilities, the question becomes whether
mergers should be disallowed where any, some, or many people are
made worse off.
The measurement of allocative efficiency is much more ephemeral
than the measurement of productive efficiency" and has led economists
to create simple models in order to determine how policy should be
shaped relative to allocative efficiency. One such model was created by
Vilfredo Pareto in 1909.32 Pareto's theory postulated that a market
status was efficient when no change from that position could make a
person better off without making another person worse off. This was
termed "Pareto optimality.'33 "Pareto optimality," however, is not a
very practical system and necessarily would promote the status quo, as
long as one person is made worse off by the change.
For example, laws requiring greater pollution control and laws
restricting white-collar crime would both be inefficient under Pareto's
axiom because various people are made worse off by the passage of
those laws, namely, polluters and white-collar criminals. However, it is
clear that social welfare is furthered through passage of these laws.
Modem economic theorists avoid this practical limitation by the creation
of "potential" Pareto efficiency, which dictates that a situation is more
efficient if more people are made better off than are made worse off by

30. For a good discussion of allocative efficiency and its role under the Chicago School
approach, see Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 239.

31. For example, it is much more difficult to determine whether all the people affected by a
certain merger are better or worse off as individuals, as compared to determining the relative costs
of inputs and outputs for the merging firm and its competitors.
32. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 239 (discussing the Pareto definition of allocative
efficiency).
33. See id.
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the change.34 The Chicago School approach generally follows the
premise of "potential" Pareto efficiency. In fact, the guiding principal of
the Chicago School theory is that antitrust policy should concern itself
exclusively with maximizing net allocative efficiency.
The Chicago School approach is based on the following additional
assumptions." First, firms are in business to maximize their profits.
Second, the only real type of barrier to entry into a market is a barrier
caused by governmental regulation.3 6 Non-governmental, or "natural,"
barriers will not last, as firms will tend to invest in markets that yield the
highest return.37 Third, most markets are competitive even if they are
highly concentrated. Fourth, the market will autonomously correct
monopoly situations because other firms will enter the market seeking a
share of the monopolist's higher profits. Fifth, many industries can
operate at maximum efficiency levels only at high levels of concentration. Sixth, antitrust law should only be concerned with enforcement
when firms are acting inefficiently, and antitrust law should always
encourage efficiency.38 Finally, adherence to the neoclassical market
efficiency model as the sole guide for antitrust policy is nonpolitical.3 9
This, it is claimed, is true because the question of how wealth should be
distributed is not part of the equation in the neoclassical market
efficiency model.40
These fundamental assumptions of the Chicago School approach,
based on the neoclassical market efficiency model, led the pro-business
Reagan Administration to refrain from challenging many of the mergers
which took place in the 1980s. 4' Additionally, in 1982 Reagan appoint-a2
ed William F. Baxter as the head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ.

34. See id. at 239-40.
35. For a more detailed overview of these assumptions, see id. at 226-29.
36. See BORK, supra note 1, at 310-29.
37. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 227.
38. Ironically, the Warren Court was famous for strict antitrust enforcement that would

typically disregard whether or not its ruling would fiuther or hinder efficiency, even going so far as
to refer to efficiency as a "source of evil." See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust
Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 714 (1982).
39. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92-94 (1981); BORK, supra note
1, at 418-25.
40. See Lande, supra note 25, at 636-37.
41. For an example of an exception to this general attitude toward validating vertical mergers,
see In re B.F. Goodrich Co., I10 F.T.C. 207 (1988).
42. Baxter has been characterized as a "known opponent of the antitrust law." Shift in
Analytical Approach Highlights Antitrust Conference, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1240, at 829 (Nov. 14, 1985). A keen example of the attitude held by the Reagan Administration,
through Baxter, came when the DOJ acted as amicus curiae and argued to reconsider the per se rule
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This was a clear step toward furthering the philosophies of laissez-faire
toward vertical mergers and an overt acceptance of the Chicago School
approach by the executive branch.43 There was little change in policy
during the Bush Administration. This "hands-off' attitude toward vertical
mergers was justified by the Reagan and Bush Administrations as probusiness and fit well within the construct of "Reaganomics" and the
"trickle down theory," where the basic assumptions were that the market
(1) is self-correcting, (2) operates best when left alone, and (3) spreads
the wealth downward to consumers. These policies which lead to a lowprofile antitrust division of the DOJ continued despite rising concern over
the practical applicability of the Chicago School approach by academia.
Heading into the Clinton Administration there was a widespread
acceptance of the Chicago School approach to antitrust enforcement by
the government and the courts, despite the mounting controversy about
how the theories of the approach should govern the duties of the DOJ,
FTC, and FCC. Whether due to the fact that the Clinton Administration
was pro-consumer, felt unable to ignore the overwhelming number of
mergers, or was sympathetic to the mounting criticism of the Chicago
School approach, the Administration proved to be slightly more active
than the preceding two administrations in enforcing vertical merger
restraints.4'
The reasons for a higher profile enforcement of antitrust laws are
grounded in not only the traditional concerns about the effects of vertical
mergers, but also a new theory which purports that not all vertical

against resale price maintenance in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
n.7 (1984). For an article commenting on Baxter's efforts in this case, see Eleanor M. Fox &
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from?
WhereAre We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 951-53 (1987).
43. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, DecisionMakers Do Matter,in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
JUDICIARY 301, 302 (James A. Dom & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987) ("[C]onglomerate mergers (and
vertical mergers as well) were viewed as being inoffensive, even benign" by the DOJ under Baxter.);
Lisa Meckfessel Judson, Note, Kodak v. Image Technical Services: The Taming of Matsushita and

the Chicago School, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 1633, 1643-44 (noting that certain Reagan appointments
furthered the Chicago School philosophies, and citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), as the coming of age of the Chicago School approach).

44. See Alliant Techsystems, Inc., F.T.C. FileNo. 941-0123 (Nov. 15, 1994); Eli Lilly and Co.,
F.T.C. File No. 941-0102 (Nov. 3, 1994); United States v. Electronic Payment Servs., Inc., 59 Fed.
Reg. 44,757 (1994) (comments relating to proposed final judgment); United States v. Electronic
Payment, Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 94-208 (D. Del. Apr. 21, 1994) (complaint); United States v. TeleCommunications, Inc. & Liberty Media Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723 (1994) (proposed final
judgment); see also Stephen Labaton, At Justice, the Taming of a Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,

1995, at I (discussing Clinton's appointment of Anne K. Bingaman as head of the antitrust division
of the DOJ).
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mergers are harmless in the context of the ultimate antitrust goal of
avoiding reductions in competition. This new theory has become known
as the post-Chicago approach.
D. After Chicago
Keeping in form with the cyclical history of antitrust enforcement,45 it has become clear that the days of utter laissez-faire toward
vertical mergers are numbered. In part, this has been a result of
disagreement between Chicago School theorists and post-Chicago
theorists as to the consequences of what the two groups agree are the
potential harms of vertical mergers. Post-Chicago theorists acknowledge
that the Chicago School recognized the potential for collusion and
foreclosure, but they disagree with the conclusions regarding the actual
anticompetitive harm from these consequences.46 In part, the cyclical
turn has been based on the same type of populist-like concern toward
large combinations that was a substantial part of the impetus for the
passage of the Sherman Act and was the force behind the early days of
antitrust enforcement.47

45. See Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENT 113, 115 (Earl F. Cheit ed., 1964) (describing the three phrases in the history of
antitrust between 1890 and 1964: 1890 to 1914 represented diligent enforcement; 1914 to 1937 was
the "era of neglect"; and 1937 to early 1964 represented a "reactivation" of enforcement).
The next cyclical turns occurred between 1965 and the present. There was less and less
enforcement against mergers from 1965 to 1992, and from 1992 to the present there may be a turn
toward more enforcement, or at least more reasons for such a turn. See generally Michael S. Jacobs,
The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1994) (discussing the cyclical
nature of antitrust enforcement); Judson, supra note 43, at 1672-73 (noting that "antitrust policy is
not static; it is cyclical, evolving in tandem with our perceptions of modem industrial society").
For a discussion of the changes in American business concentration since the Civil War, see
BA1N, supra note 1, at 100-11.
46. See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 518 (1995).
For an early critique of the Chicago School, see Hovenkamp, supra note 22. See also
Thomas J. Campbell, Predationand Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87
COLUtM. L. REV. 1625 (1987) (arguing that new efficient firms can be forced out of the market by
an equally efficient established firm); Carl Shapiro, The Theory of Business Strategy, 20 RAND J.
ECON. 125 (1989); Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's Going,
27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 289 (1983).
47. For a discussion of the public sentiment that supported the passage of the Sherman Act,
see William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv.
221 (1956).
There is evidence that the current public sentiment regarding large mergers is still one of
skepticism. See David W. Barnes, None iciency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 787, 791 n.8 (1989) (noting that public lack of faith in competition is similar to what
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There are several traditional concerns about vertical mergers. First,
vertical mergers tend to reduce competition by eliminating potential
entrants into the market because, in some instances, at least the vertically
merging firm is a potential entrant into the market of the other.48 For
example, Chrysler may attempt to begin to manufacture its own brand of
tire, to ensure a source of tires, while Goodyear may begin to manufacture its own vehicle, to ensure a buyer of tires. Second, if the industry
standard in the particular market is such that firms must be "two-tiered"
in order to enter the market and effectively compete, then this presents
a barrier to entry.49 Third, there is a potential harm to competition if the
vertically merged firm forecloses other firms' access to a supplier or
purchaser by either refusing to sell to that firm or by creating an artificial
price level, or "price squeeze., 50 For example, after the merger of
Chrysler and Goodyear, if Goodyear refuses to sell to General Motors,
then General Motors' supply is restricted and they may be foreclosed
from competing with Chrysler, or the price of tires to General Motors
may increase after Goodyear refuses to sell to General Motors, due to
new market conditions in the tire industry."' Finally, the vertically
integrated firm may impart a fear in unintegrated rivals about competing

it was during the Great Depression (quoting Shift in Analytical Approach Highlights Antitrust
Conference,supra note 42, at 832)); Roberta Romano, The Future ofHostile Takeovers: Legislation
and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 490 (1988) (concluding that the public is "distrustful
of bigness in general" and is mostly concerned with consumer protection).
For an attempt to explain the changes in business concentration, see BAIN, supra note 1, at
215-21. Of course, one of the main goals of the 1950 amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act was
to halt the "rising tide of economic concentration." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
315 (1962).
48. This was a concern in FordMotor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 570-71 (1972).
49. See id. at 568; W'alter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust,Ideology, and the Arabesques
of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 306 (1995); 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note
19, 13,103, at 20,565.
50. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 605 (6th Cir. 1970); Reynolds Metals
Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 228-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962); 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 19,
13,103, at 20,565. But see BORK, supra note 1, at 243-44 (finding certain price squeezes desirable,
as they represent a shift in business "from less to more efficient operations'). See generally Oliver
Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC AcTvTY 205 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1990); Janusz A. Ordover et
al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,80 AM. ECON. REv. 127 (1990); Janusz A. Ordover et al.,
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 698 (1992); David Reiffen,
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure:Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 694 (1992); Michael A. Salinger,
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure,77 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988).
51. But see BORK, supra note 1, at 232 (insisting that such buyers will always be able to find
sellers).
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with the larger, vertically integrated firm.52
Although the first and fourth concerns regarding vertical mergers,
stated in the previous paragraph, are refuted under the Chicago School
approach,53 the second and third concerns have given rise to numerous
recent commentaries questioning the Chicago School approach.
Generally, the criticism of the Chicago School approach has centered on

its impracticality and inapplicability to "real world" concerns. As a result,
critics have called for a more scrutinizing case-by-case examination of
vertical mergers as opposed to the typical summary validation of such
mergers based on Chicago School theory.54
The development of the criticism toward the Chicago School theory

has an ironic history. First, in the mid-1980s, the courts disregarded
general criticism of the Chicago School by early commentators due to the
popularity of the Chicago School efficiency model.55 Next, in the early1990s, a body of case law developed which rejected some of the
simplistic assumptions made by the Chicago School approach regarding
market participants' actions in the United States economy, based on the
notion that market participants were "sophisticated. 56 However, this

52. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 556 (E.D. Pa.
1969). But see, BORK, supra note 1, at 257 ("The idea that the smaller firms will refrain from profitable behavior out of fear seems wholly unlikely ... :.
53. Regarding the concern over eliminating potential entrants, under the Chicago School
approach it is clear that if the market is ripe for an entrant and a business firm then enters the market
to reap the profits, the fact that a potential entrant is eliminated is irrelevant to the overall market
functions. Also, "fear" is not a concern where business firms are competing for a profit in a
competitive market. See BORK, supra note 1, at 256 (explaining that at the moment of merger there
is a greater desire to compete vigorously, not a fear of doing so).
54. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies by
DominantFirms, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1256-63 (1992).
55. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
56. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1422-23 (S.D. Iowa 1991); United States
v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 679-80 (D. Minn. 1990); cf. FTC v. University
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 n.13 (1 th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the sophisticated buyer defense,
but concluding that the defendant could not assert it as to insurers because of the insurers' inability
to "refuse to reimburse their subscribers because the prices in the relevant market were too high");
United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1085 (D. Del. 1991) (recognizing the
sophisticated buyer defense, but rejecting application to its facts); United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704
F. Supp. 1409, 1427-28 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (recognizing the sophisticated buyer defense as "[the
defendants' most persuasive argument" but rejecting its application to the facts). But see Jacobs,
supra note 45, at 2, 51-53 (concluding that the more detailed judicial review of mergers under the
"sophistication doctrine" would "cripple antitrust administration" and advocating that the judiciary
rely on more assumptions when analyzing market behavior).
Ultimately the sophisticated buyer defense was recognized by the Supreme Court in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), although the Court found that
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departure from the basic Chicago School analysis tended to validate
mergers, rather than restrict them, and (perhaps because of the popularity
of efficiency justifications for mergers with courts at the time) this
analysis was welcomed by courts, whereas the early post-Chicago
theorists of the mid-1980s were ignored. 7
Ironically, as courts became willing to take a more realistic or
detailed look at mergers in order to justify validation of a greater number
of efficient mergers, there grew a second body of post-Chicago
commentary which concluded that the courts' "closer look" should not
disregard side-effects of vertical mergers, such as after-market effects and
barriers to entry, which allegedly cause market foreclosures and increases
in monopoly power. 8 This second wave of post-Chicago theory had a
better opportunity for success in the courts based on their willingness to
perform a more detailed examination of mergers. In fact, some scholars
saw the decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc. 9 as a validation of post-Chicago theory in the early-1990s. 60 The
criticisms of the Chicago School which gained an audience in the courts,
marking a trend toward a more detailed judicial review, should be
considered in deciding whether there should be a judicial departure from
the Chicago School and an eventual judicial conclusion that antitrust law
should restrain the recent flux of vertical mergers in the entertainment
industry.

the facts of the case did not warrant Kodak's use of the defense, based on Kodak's ability to deal
only with unsophisticated buyers. See id. at 475-77.
Also, in some cases sophisticated suppliers "can deter their powerful buyers from

overcharging consumers." Jacobs, supra note 45, at 2 (citing United States v. Syufy Enters., 903
F.2d 659, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1990)).
57. See cases cited supra note 56.
58. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46. But see David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment:
Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTmTRusT L.J. 917, 919 (1995) (finding Riordan
and Salop's article unpersuasive due to "a faulty analogy between vertical and horizontal mergers"
made by the authors, regarding concentration issues).
59. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).

60. See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations ofAntitrust Economics,
74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 246 (1995) (stating that Kodak "bears compelling witness to the growing

acceptance of the post-Chicago perspective"); Judson, supra note 43, at 1633 (detecting a "shift[]
[in] the focus of antitrust summary judgment away from an assessment of economic plausibility and
toward the use of economic theory as a tool to explain market realities"); Robert H. Lande, Chicago
Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World,
62 ANrrmusT L.J. 193, 197 (1993) (speculating that after Kodak "post-Chicago School has the
opportunity to advance").
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1. The Sophistication Doctrine
The sophistication doctrine represents an early critique of the
simplicity of the Chicago School approach, and application of the
sophistication doctrine by the courts represents a departure from the
approach, which later led to the current critique of the Chicago School
as reaching erroneous conclusions as to potential anticompetitive effects
of vertical mergers. Although application of the sophistication doctrine
does not inherently suggest that there should be more or less antitrust
enforcement against vertical mergers, it should be discussed as a prelude
to the body of critique that suggests that a more detailed analysis of the
increasing number of vertical mergers could lead to more vertical
mergers being invalidated.
The sophistication doctrine provides that firms with tactical
expertise, knowledgeability, or intelligence are sophisticated 1 and thus,
will be able "to combat their competitors' market power more effectively
than their merely rational counterparts. ' Thus, a "sophisticated buyer
defense" has developed for firms that engage in vertical mergers which
would otherwise face antitrust obstacles. This defense dictates that where
a seller with market power proves that his buyer is sophisticated, such a
fact can be a mitigating circumstance to his otherwise actual or potential
monopolistic power.6' For example, if a hypothetical rubber manufacturer and a rubber shipping company merge to form Rubber United, Rubber
United could assert that Goodyear is a sophisticated buyer and therefore,
despite the market power of Rubber United, there will be no detriments
to competition as a result of the merger.
Ultimately, application of the sophistication doctrine represents a
new factor for market power analysis requiring courts to determine
whether inequality or super-rationality characteristics exist in market
participants. Critics argue that this more detailed analysis clouds the
antitrust picture 64 because market share-i.e., concentration-is no
longer the only issue that courts must assess in determining whether a

61. Some define sophistication in terms of the "tactical expertise or negotiating success" of
experienced firms, and other theorists describe it as "the quality of being fully informed about
commercially relevant matters" in that these firms are more "knowledgeable" than the others. Jacobs,
supra note 45, at 17-18.
62. Id. at 2-3.
63. For examples of analyses under the sophistication doctrine, see cases cited supranote 56.
64. See Jacobs, supra note 45, at 8 (characterizing such judicial analysis as a "quixotic
searchO").
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firm has market power.6a However, if courts merely follow the Chicago
School approach, without deeper investigation as to the market conditions, they would be failing to thoroughly analyze the case with respect
to achieving the ultimate goal of determining whether competition really
would be harmed in a given case.66 This more detailed analysis has
found solid support in the courts, which have begun to realize the need
at least to consider "sophistication." 67

However, as a result, judicial antitrust administration not only
departed from the simplistic efficiency models of the Chicago
School 6 8 -whose application eased judicial review 69 -but, courts,
perhaps being enamored with efficiency, inevitably made the more
complex analysis in order to allow mergers between firms with larger

market shares, if greater efficiency was presented as a justification for the
firm wanting to integrate. Whereas previously, a court only would
look to see if the firm had a large market share, under the sophistication
doctrine, a large-market-share firm may claim that it does not have
market power.
Thus, the application of the sophistication doctrine represents how
the basic principles of the Chicago School theory are used as a spring

board, enabling courts to validate ever more extensive vertical mergers,
based on the notion of efficiency. The judicial administration of vertical

mergers has gone through a complete transformation. Whereas before the
Chicago School approach, in the 1960s and 1970s, courts were finding

65. See id. at 21.
66. But see id. at 24 (concluding that judicial analysis of antitrust issues under the traditional
"rationality assumption" method is preferred since "the new sophistication will impede the effective
adjudication of antitrust disputes").
67. See cases cited supra note 56; see also Jacobs, supra note 45, at 11-12 (commenting on
the reception of the sophistication doctrine in the courts).
68. See Judson, supra note 43, at 1661 (describing a judicial shift away from the presumptions
supported by the Chicago School).
69. See Jacobs, supranote 45, at 50-51 (noting that the potentially complex methodologies of
the Chicago School approach never materialized).
70. See cases cited supra note 56. This state of the law contravenes the Supreme Court's
recognition of administrative efficiency. See F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411, 430 (1990) ("The administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually
compelling."); Jacobs, supra note 45, at 24-34 (discussing how new methodology changes by the
courts will "impede the effective adjudication of antitrust disputes"); see also William L. Reynolds
& Spencer W. Waller, Legal Processand the PastofAntitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1811, 1832 (1995)
(discussing the complexity of modem merger analysis).
It is thus easy to see how courts, fearful of performing more complex analyses of antitrust
issues, would more likely defer to the basic premise of the Chicago School than to the harmlessness
of vertical mergers, and conclude that the sophisticated-buyer defense should not dissuade them
against approving the merger.
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subjective ways to invalidate vertical mergers based on the Harvard
school of industrial organization,7 now courts in the 1990s are, through
use of the sophistication72 doctrine, finding more subjective ways to
validate vertical mergers.
Thus, the sophistication doctrine opened the door to more complex
inquiries into "real market" conditions. A faction of antitrust thinkers in
academia 73 might have harbored the following question when refining
the foundations behind the post-Chicago approach: If courts are going to
delve into complex characteristics of the market to afford some largemarket-share firm the ability to complete a vertical merger under the
sophisticated buyer defense, then why should not the same court look
into the economic realities that suggest that some vertical mergers really
result in negative effects such as increased monopoly power and
foreclosure? In other words, if courts are willing to move away from the
simplistic economic models of the Chicago School to reach the
conclusion that an otherwise anticompetitive merger should be considered
competitively neutral, then they should step away from those same
models and conclude that other vertical mergers really do increase
monopoly power and cause market foreclosure.
2. Increased Power of Monopoly and Foreclosure
Perhaps spurred on by this paradoxical inconsistency, experts have
recently turned a more scrutinizing and meticulous eye toward the
general conclusions of the Chicago School and have found that for
various reasons vertical mergers might not be as benign as previously
thought.74 Specifically, critics of the Chicago School have identified
three types of evils as potential results of vertical mergers.75
First, exclusionary effects may result from increasing rivals' costs
of doing business. This may entail raising unintegrated firms' input costs
by foreclosing their access to important inputs or foreclosing their access

71. The Harvard school of industrial organization advocated detailed analysis of particular
industries. See Jacobs, supra note 45, at 36 (citing BAiN, supra note 1; JAMES W. MCKIE, TIN CANS
AND TIN PLATE: A STUDY OF COMPETITION IN TwO RELATED MARKETS (1959)).

72. This leads to the inevitable inconsistency of enforcement based on ambiguous standards.
The 1984 Merger Guidelines fail to assist the practitioner in navigating the myriad of possible
judicial outcomes to any given merger. Thus, it is uncertain whether firms are better off today
existing in unpredictable times, or whether they were better offbefore the Chicago School approach

was established, when they could expect and plan for stricter enforcement of antitrust laws. See
supra note 9; see also cases cited supra note 56.
73. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46.
74. See supra note 46.
75. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 519-20.
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to a sufficient customer base. Specifically, this is referred to as "input
foreclosure" and "customer foreclosure," respectively.7 6 Input foreclosure results from upstream" firms refusing to sell to rival downstream
competitors or simply raising those competitors' costs for their inputs."
For example, if Goodyear and Chrysler merged and thereafter Goodyear
stopped selling to Ford and General Motors, or simply raised its prices
to those companies, those downstream rivals would be at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to Chrysler.
The Chicago School justification for allowing this type of merger
would be that the competitive nature of the tire market would result in
one of three possible scenarios: the existing firms will compete for the
input supply refused by Goodyear, another competitor will enter the
market to compete for that share, or a switching of buying and selling
partners will occur. However, this simple conclusion requires insight into
how the other tire suppliers will react in reality. Market conditions may
not return to pre-merger conditions because other tire suppliers may be
unable to expand their production of tires, or they may simply forego
expansion because of their gain in market power or their new ability to
coordinate pricing in the absence of Goodyear.79 Under each of these
scenarios Ford and General Motors are worse off because of the vertical
merger.
Customer foreclosure occurs when the downstream merged customer
refuses to buy from the upstream rival firm.8" In our ongoing GoodyearChrysler example this would mean that Chrysler (downstream merged
customer) discontinues its habit of buying tires from Michelin. The result
could be that Michelin will have higher unit costs" and thereby be less
competitive, or in a worst case scenario, that Michelin will be forced out
of the market.8 2 Also, with respect to the rival output firms (Ford and

76. Id. at 519.
77. "Upstream" refers to firms that manufacture and distribute inputs for sale to other
"downstream" firms which assemble or otherwise use the inputs as part of their business. See
SCHERER, supranote 2, at 78. Firms can simultaneously be "upstream" and "downstream" depending

on the perspective. Thus, Goodyear is downstream from the perspective of a rubber manufacturer,
but Goodyear is upstream from the perspective of Chrysler.

78. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 528-29.
79. See id. at 528.
80. See id. at 551.
81. In other words, their marginal cost of producing tires increases due to the decreased
demand for their supply.

82. In this way, input foreclosure and customer foreclosure may be seen as mutually exclusive
possibilities because under input foreclosure if Goodyear stops selling to Ford, then customer
foreclosure to Michelin is unlikely because Michelin would supposedly sell to Ford in order to pick
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General Motors), because of the Goodyear-Chrysler merger the cost of
input to Ford and General Motors may increase above the competitive
level, namely because Michelin has higher unit costs. Consequently, the
cost of cars to consumers could also increase. Under either "input
foreclosure" or "customer foreclosure" the resulting competitive harms
should compel enforcement against companies attempting such vertical
mergers.
The second type of evil which could result from a vertical merger
is the potential exchange of pricing and other competitively sensitive
information between the input or output markets." This results when
the output firm does not have all of its input requirements fulfilled by the
vertical merger with the input firm. For example, Chrysler still needs to
buy some tires from tire companies other than Goodyear. The theory is
that Chrysler gains insight into pricing and supply information from other
tire companies and can relay this to its merged partner, Goodyear. As a
result, Goodyear gets a competitive advantage. More importantly, the
likelihood for coordinated conduct among all of the unintegrated tire
manufacturers increases.8 Even though coordination probably would not
hurt the tire industry, the conduct could harm the car industry and
ultimately the consumer, by allowing tire manufacturers to raise their
prices above competitive levels.
Third, a vertical merger could help a regulated firm evade costbased, maximum price regulation by setting an artificially high transfer
price on inputs sold by the upstream division to the downstream division
and, as a result, shift profits from the regulated to the unregulated
market."
The conclusion of post-Chicago theory is that while many vertical
mergers lead to efficiency benefits, the previous assumption that all
vertical mergers are competitively neutral or pro-competitive, is flawed.
Therefore, the court should perform a balancing between the efficiency
up where Goodyear left off. In the most simple terms, these types of foreclosures represent an
either/or situation.
In analyzing the FTC's decision in In re A.G. Spalding & Bros., 56 F.T.C. 1125 (1960),
Bork made light of the proposition that "eager suppliers and hungry customers" would be unable to
"find each other" after they were displaced by vertically merging companies. BORK, supra note 1,
at 232.
83. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 557.
84. Three conditions must be met in order for competitive concerns to arise under these
circumstances: the information must be useable, the information must be unique and therefore beneficial, and the structure of the input market must be conducive to pricing coordination. See id. at 55861.
85. See id. at 561-64.
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benefits against the three types of competitive harm: foreclosure,
86
information exchange, and regulation evasion.
E. The CurrentState of Certainty in the Law
The question of whether to apply the Chicago School approach or
to apply more complex models in assessing the validity of vertical
mergers has not been directly addressed by many courts.8 7 While early
application of the Chicago School approach led to easier judicial
administration, undertaking the more detailed analysis of the postChicago approach obviously creates more problems for the courts as well
as for those who desire predictability when planning complex commercial
mergers and acquisitions.
However, it is clear that judicial convenience and predictability for
business firms are not the driving forces in determining whether vertical
mergers will be upheld. Rather, trends in antitrust law have apparently
been founded on vague ideas of right and wrong about various actions
of American businesses. For example, the current trend is toward a more
detailed analysis in order to give as much deference as possible to the
firms claiming that their goal is efficiency, as the courts favor efficiency.
The only consistency of law in this area has been that before the Chicago
approach came about, courts invalidated vertical mergers without regard
to efficiency and since the Chicago approach's dominating reign, courts
have validated vertical mergers based on a general conclusion that they
are efficient.
Perhaps the certainty engendered by the "efficiency justification"
may be a factual explanation for the feverish pace of mergers in 1995
and the confidence with which some law firms and consulting firms have
put together multi-billion dollar mergers. 8

86. See id. at 564.
87. One court has commented that antitrust rules "cannot always take account of every
complex economic circumstance or qualification." Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d
17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990).
In fact, courts have acknowledged that the goals of clarity and administration have lead to
per se rules. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).

One attribute of the per se rule is how it allows more predictability for businessmen as to what
federal enforcement agencies will do. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609
n.10 (1972) (noting that "[w]ithout the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them
in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman
Act"). For academic support of the per se rule, see Robert H. Bork, The Rule ofReason and the Per
Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
88. In fact, the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore handled representation for

CapCitieslABC in their merger with Disney, spending approximately 60 concentrated hours to
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Under the more demanding case-by-case analysis of the postChicago approach, would there be more antitrust prevention of vertical
mergers? As discussed above, the "sophistication doctrine" and postChicago theories dictate that the analysis performed by the court must be
a very complex one.89 In fact, such judicial analyses could result in

arbitrary determinations. Accordingly, from the almost per se illegality
of vertical mergers in the 1960s to mid-1970s, to the almost blind
acceptance of all vertical mergers from the late 1970s to early 1990s, we
have now come to a point where judicial determination may have the
theoretical and economic justification to make an even more in-depth
review of mergers. After such a detailed review the court could conclude
that despite some efficiency aspects, government agencies should use

antitrust law to disallow some vertical mergers.
The question becomes whether it will take something as earth
shaking as the Chicago School approach to swing the pendulum back
toward more restraint of vertical mergers. Ironically, the solution to the
seemingly unjust tendency to follow general themes when judging
matters that effect many businesses directly, may lie in the two seminal
cases: Brown Shoe and FordMotor.
F

Two Cases in the Eye of the Storm: Brown Shoe and Ford Motor

In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,9" the Supreme Court was
faced with a case where the third largest seller of shoes, Brown Shoe,

complete the project. The day after that merger was complete, they began work on CBS's planned
merger with Westinghouse. See Mark Hansen, Disney Deal Done in One Long Weekend: Lawyers
Work Round the Clock to Accomplish $19 Billion Takeover ofABC, 81 A.B.A. J. 20 (1995). Cravath
completed all the work on both mergers within a 10 day period. See Dominic Bencivenga, Just Like
the Old Days: M&A Lawyers Juggle Back-to-Back Mega-Deals, 214 N.Y. L.J. 28 (1995).
89. Even the Supreme Court has admitted that "courts are of limited utility in examining
difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of
competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one
important reason we have formulated per se rules." Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 (footnote omitted).
This unwillingness to make complex economic determinations dates back to United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), where the Court declined to make a "complete survey of our
economic organization and a choice between rival [economic] philosophies" absent "express legislation requiring it." Id. at 398.
However, the Supreme Court has recently demonstrated a willingness to tackle the facts,
even if complex, in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); Eastman Kodak v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). But see Jacobs, supra note 45, at 34 (concluding
that neither courts nor administrative review could efficiently or successfully apply the sophistication
doctrine).
90. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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wanted to acquire Kinney, the eighth largest seller of shoes.9 1 To the
extent that both companies manufactured and distributed shoes, the
merger had significant horizontal aspects. 92 However, a key fact was
that Kinney's 350 retail outlets represented the largest distributorship to

handle brands other than its own. 3 In this regard, the acquisition had
key vertical characteristics, amounting to a potential foreclosure of outlets
to those shoe manufacturers who previously sold through the Kinney
outlet.
After defining the product market as "men's, women's, and
children's shoes"94 and the geographic market as the "entire Nation,"95
the Court proceeded to explain the important factors in its analysis. These
included whether the arrangement was a "limited term exclusive-dealing
contract... [or] a tying contract," 96 whether the arrangement was for
the purpose of saving a "failing company,"97 and whether the arrangement was between two small companies. 98 The Court found that this

was not an arrangement between two small companies, or an attempt to
save a failing company, and was more like a tying arrangement, than a
short-term exclusive-dealing contract.9 9 The Court concluded that it was

more like a tying contract because of the evidence indicating that Brown
would "force" its shoes into Kinney stores.'
But, perhaps the key to the Court's conclusion that the merger
should be enjoined was based on its final factor of analysis-considering

"the trend toward concentration in the industry."' 0 ' Acknowledging that
91. See id.at 297.
92. Brown was the fourth largest shoe manufacturer, producing about 4% of the country's
shoes. See id. at 302-03. Kinney was the twelfth largest shoe manufacturer in the United States,
producing 0.5% of the country's shoes. See id.
at 303.
93. See id. at 331.
94. Id. at 326.
95. Id. at 328.
96. Id. at 329-30 (noting that "the market foreclosure must generally be significantly greater"
in a limited term exclusive-dealing contract in order to be violative of federal law).
97. Id. at 331 (noting Congress's "intention to preserve" such failing companies).
98. See id. (stating that a merger between two small companies is permissible where the
purpose of the merger "is to enable them in combination to compete with larger corporations
dominating the market").
99. See id. at 331-32.
100. See id. at 332. The Court emphasized that "ownership integration is a more permanent and
irreversible tie than is contract integration." Id. at 332 n.55 (citing Friedrich Kessler & Richard H.
Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 78 (1959) (concluding that
"a greater degree of integration is tolerable when contract is used")).
101. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 332. The Court detailed the legislative history behind the
1950 amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act, which made the Act applicable to vertical mergers. See
id. at 311-23; see also Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
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the "probable future effect of the merger" should be considered, 2 the
Court went on to conclude that based on a significant tendency toward
integration in the industry,t03 the acquisition of Kinney by Brown Shoe
should be enjoined because otherwise the
merger would have worked to
14
"substantially ...lessen competition."'
In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 05 the Supreme Court reviewed an order from the lower court divesting ownership of Electric
Autolite Co. ("Autolite") from Ford Motor Co. ("Ford").0 6 At the time,
Ford was the second-leading maker of cars and, together with General
Motors and Chrysler, accounted for 90% of the automobile production
in the United States.0 7 Prior to Ford's acquisition of Autolite in 1961,
it bought its spark plugs from Champion, when there were two independent domestic producers of spark plugs; Champion, which had a 50%
share of the domestic spark plug market in 1960,08 and Autolite,
which had a 15% market share at about that time." 9 Within five years

Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226,249-58 (1960) (proposing possible interpretations of the language
of § 7); Eleanor M. Fox, The Politicsof Law and Economics in JudicialDecisionMaking: Antitrust
as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 565 (1986) (discussing the legislative history behind the § 7
amendments); Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, Comment, Competitor Standing to Challenge a Merger of
Rivals: The Applicability of Strategic Behavior Analysis, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2057, 2076-78 (1987)
(detailing the legislative background of the § 7 amendments).
During this discussion the Court made it clear that fear of "economic concentration" was the
impetus behind the amendments. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315; see also United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966) (noting a congressional desire to "arrestol [the) trend toward
concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the point that a market was left in the
grip of a few big companies").
Furthermore, the Brown Shoe Court noted that "the protection of small businesses" was
another goal of the amendments to § 7 that could be gleaned from the legislative history. See 370
U.S. at 315-16. The Court also cited to Judge Learned Hand's opinion in UnitedStates v. Aluminum
Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945), where he stated that "[throughout the history of
these [antitrust] statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units
which can effectively compete with each other." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316 n.28 (alteration in
original). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 250 (claiming that the small business lobby's
power was behind § 7 amendments). Hovenkamp also outlines how Chicago School theorists made
an attenuated argument to get around legislative history, claiming first a legislative intent for
consumer welfare generally, then extrapolating upon this to reach an "efficiency justification" for
antitrust policy. See id. at 250-55.
102. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332.
103. See id. at 301.
104. Id. at 334.
105. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
106. See id. at 564-65.
107. See id. at 565.
108. See id. at 566.
109. See id.
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of Ford's acquisition of Autolite, Champion's market share declined to
33%.110
In finding that the merger should be disallowed, the Court noted two
factors from the district court's ruling. First, Ford acted as a check
against the ability of supra-competitive pricing in the oligopolistic spark
plug market because of its status as a potential entrant into the spark plug
market.' Second, the Court noted that by acquiring Autolite, Ford was
removing itself as a purchaser of "about ten per cent of total industry
output."'" 2 This represented customer foreclosure to the spark plug
manufacturers in a similar way that Brown Shoe's purchase of Kinney
would have resulted in customer foreclosure-i.e., if Kinney is viewed
as a pseudo customer, instead of being viewed as a distributor, or outlet.
The resulting foreclosure would tend to reduce the likelihood of future
deconcentration in the spark plug market." 3 This result would be a
consequence of the raised barriers to entry that would have been caused
by the merger. 14
In reaching its conclusion the Court observed that the evil caused by
the merger was
to foreclose to the remaining independent spark plug manufacturers the
substantial segment of the market previously open to competitive
selling and to remove the significant procompetitive effects in the
concentrated spark plug market that resulted from Ford's position on
the edge of the market as a potential entrant." 5
Thus, the Court preferred Ford's position as potential entrant into the
market because in that position Ford encouraged the already oligopolistic
market competitors to behave in a more competitive, and less monopolistic, fashion. Another benefit to Ford's nonintegrated position was that it
would increase the probability of a new entrant succeeding in the spark
plug market. There would be no necessity for a "two-tiered" entry. In
other words, a new entrant would not need to be its own customer by
selling cars as well as spark plugs.
Brown Shoe and FordMotor were the main impetus behind the rise
of the Chicago School approach. Unquestioning deference to the analysis

110. See id.
111. See id.at 567-68. There were only three significant manufacturers of spark plugs,
controlling 95% of the market share at the time of the acquisition. See id.
at 566 & n.3.
112. Id. at 568.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 574.
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in these two cases is not called for, but some of the important parts of
the reasoning in those cases foreshadowed the problem with rising
integration in the entertainment industry.
II.

VERTICAL MERGERS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

A.

The Entertainment Industry

The number of mergers in the entertainment industry has been
steadily on the rise in the 1990S.116 In 1995 alone the entertainment
17
industry contemplated well over $35 billion worth of mergers. The
three big mergers of 1995 were: Disney and CapCities/ABC ($18.83
billion), Time-Warner and Turner Broadcasting ($6.88 billion), and
Westinghouse and CBS ($5.04 billion)."'
Each of these mergers is a massive combination and each has both
vertical and horizontal aspects." 9 The horizontal aspects of these
mergers can be described as the extent to which the mergers duplicate
holdings of the respective companies-.e., the mergers are horizontal to
the extent that they combine previous competitors in a particular
industry. For instance, Disney and ABC both owned radio stations prior
to the merger. Thus, in this regard the merger is horizontal with respect
to radio stations, and the output produced and input consumed by those
radio stations. 2 °
At the same time, the Disney-ABC merger has various vertical
aspects. For instance, Disney was able to acquire a national broadcaster

116. For example, the dollar amount of mergers in the motion picture industry in 1992 was

$1.548 billion, while in 1994 it jumped to $9.150 billion. See 1995 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 555; 1994 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 551. These figures include both vertical and horizontal mergers.

117. See Steven Lipin, Let's Do it: Disney to DiaperMakers Push Mergers and Acquisitions
to Record High, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at R8.
118. See id. This Note focuses primarily on the Disney-ABC and Time-Turner mergers because
those mergers have more vertical aspects.
119. Additionally, the mergers could be seen as "product-extension mergers," which exist when
"the products (or activities) of the partners do not compete with each other but have some functional
relationship in production or distribution." PETER ASCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ANTITRUST
POLICY 263 (rev. ed. 1983).

For a discussion of the refocusing of analysis between the vertical and horizontal aspects of
a merger, see BORK, supra note 1, at 237-38.
120. Disney owned two radio stations prior to the merger, while CapCitieslABC owned 19. See
3 DIRECTORY OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS: U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 314-18, 528-29 (1995)

[hereinafter U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES].
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for its programming.' 2 ' Although the negative effects of horizontal

121. Disney's ability to acquire an outlet for its programming was made possible when the
financial interest and syndication ("fin-syn") rules were abolished in 1995. Fin-syn rules prohibited
ABC, CBS, and NBC from purchasing financial interests or syndication rights from producers, like
Disney, and generally excluded the networks from selling syndicated programming to individual
stations. The fin-syn rules were established in the 1970s and were based on the premise that the "big
three" networks possessed monopsony power, and as a result could undermine the profitability of
non-network program suppliers, and additionally threaten the very existence of nonaffiliated,
"independent" stations. The abolition of the rules in 1995 was preceded by a relaxation of the rules
in 1993 following a series of FCC orders and court appeals. See In re Evaluation of the Syndication
and Fin. Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (1993), affid sub nom. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC,
29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Fin. Interest Rules, 6 F.C.C.R.
3094 (1991), vacated and remandedsub nom. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043
(7th Cir. 1992); In re Amendment of Syndication and Fin. Interest Rules, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1983)
(tentative decision and request for further comments).
The FCC's basis for abolishing the fin-syn rules was based on the presumption that the "big
three" networks no longer posed a threat to non-network program suppliers and "nonaffiliated"
independent stations after the emergence of such industry outlets as cable, VCRs, satellite, and other
broadcast networks. This conclusion may have been erroneous as even today the lowest rated
network, CBS, has more viewers than all the cable networks combined. See Prime-timePassions,
ECONOMtST, Aug. 5, 1995, at 55, 56 (also noting that "[a]dvertisers shelled out more than $31 billion
on broadcast TV last year compared with $4.6 billion on cable TV").
In 1995 the FCC also set August 1996 as the date for the abolition of its prime-time access
rule ("PTAR") which since the 1970s had worked as a bar to affiliates ofABC, CBS, and NBC from
airing network entertainment and other programming during the hour preceding prime time (7-8 p.m.
EST). See Michael Freeman, A Matter of Access, MEDIAWEEK, April 15, 1996, at 40. PTAR's goal
was to prevent two types of conduct that presumably limited non-network affiliated entities from
having a suitable outlet and market share. First, PTAR prohibited affiliated stations in the "top 50"
markets from airing new programming that the three networks might otherwise provide as part of
their current prime-time schedule. See id. Second, the rule disallowed those affiliates the ability to
fill that time slot with programming first aired on ABC, CBS, or NBC in previous seasons. See id.
Again, the goal of the FCC was to benefit non-network programmers and independent
stations. The non-network programmers would have another possible outlet for their product, and
if they could not air their product on a "big three" network, at least they would not have to compete
with "prime time" quality programming during that period, if they aired their product on another
outlet, such as cable. However, PTAR was more of a benefit for independent stations, who were able
to take off-network hit programs (such as "Roseanne" or "Cheers") and air them during this lucrative
time slot. Unfortunately, the FCC felt that for the same reasons that fin-syn was no longer needed,
PTAR was also unnecessary.
One goal of this Note is to show that in fact the original goal of the fin-syn rules and PTAR,
that of programming diversity, was a noble one, and that while there are more outlets for nonnetwork program suppliers, the effect of vertical integration is to cause a retrograde motion back to
the days when few entities had monopsony power over the industry.
Unfortunately, the recent passing of a major communications bill by Congress does little to
stop the trend toward integration between communication, media, and entertainment industries. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56. This act
deregulates various industries, including the telecommunications, broadcast, and cable industries,
opening the door for more vertical mergers in the entertainment industry.
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mergers are well documented, 122 this Note's purpose is to explore the
negative implications of vertical mergers. However, to a certain extent
the type of harm in each kind of merger can be very similar.
For example, both horizontal and vertical mergers have an effect on
competition and thereby on consumer welfare. In the most general terms,
horizontal mergers affect competition most at the level of the merger, but
may also affect upstream and downstream competition. In that way the
harm resulting from horizontal mergers is very similar to the type of
harm caused by vertical mergers. For example, a Chrysler-Ford merger
would certainly impact General Motors, but it could also negatively
impact the tire industry, as Chrysler-Ford would have significantly more
market power. It has been advanced that Chrysler-Ford could force any
given tire manufacturer to sell Chrysler-Ford its tires below its own
marginal cost.'23 These tire manufacturers would have to worry about
making up the lost profit caused by selling to Chrysler-Ford below
marginal cost in its sales to consumers and/or to General Motors and
other car companies.
Similarly, the horizontal aspects of the Disney-ABC merger will not
only hurt competition among radio broadcasters, but because radio
advertising is now available to Disney-ABC's television shows and
movies, the horizontal aspect of the merger also impacts other industries,
in addition to the one that is the subject of the horizontal merger. 24
Thus, Disney-ABC gains a competitive advantage over its competitors in
other industries, namely, television and movies, because Disney-ABC has
a guaranteed outlet for advertising (radio) which it can utilize at cost. In
addition, any restrictions that may apply to the type, length, or content

122.

See DAVID B. AUDRETsCH, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARDS

HORIZONTAL MERGERS 75-98 (1983); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSs, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 235-48 (3d ed. 1990). See generally Daniel J. Gifford,

The Jurisprudenceof Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1677, 1684-86 (1995) (discussing the history of
horizontal merger enforcement and the effectiveness of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines);
Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 893 (1987)

(discussing approaches to horizontal mergers in a historical context); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and

Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975) (analyzing the Supreme Court's
effectiveness in dealing with mergers).
123. See generally SCHERER, supra note 2, at 229-67.

124. This function of the merger is a major part of the efficiency justification. For a discussion
of the efficiency justification supporting horizontal mergers, see Robert Pitofsky, Proposalsfor
Revised United States MergerEnforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195 (1992); C. Paul
Rogers, The Limited Casefor an Efficiency Defense in HorizontalMergers, 58 TUL. L. REV. 503

(1983); and Steve Stockum, The Efficiencies Defense for Horizontal Mergers: What Is the
Government's Standard?, 61 ANTITRUST W. 829 (1993).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:261

of any such advertisement would presumably not apply to use by the
parent company. In this way the horizontal aspect of this merger impacts
other industries, and Disney-ABC's ability to sell its output is improved
over its competitors in television and movies. These vertical-type harms,
caused by the horizontal aspects of these mergers, are significant factors
to consider when analyzing how the mergers occurring in 1995 affected
the entertainment industry.
1. Specifics of the Mergers
Both the Disney-ABC and Time-Turner mergers are about shoring
up content (and the means for producing content), and each of them, as
well as the Westinghouse-CBS merger, is also about securing radio and
television broadcasting or cable outlets for the content produced. Content
is what makes the industry work. Content includes, for example, Disney's
production of television shows such as "Home Improvement" and
"Ellen." The outlets for such content-rich companies as Disney and
Time-Warner include, for Disney, the eight television stations, nineteen
radio stations, sixty-five newspapers/trade/advertising publications, and
sixteen publishers of CapCities/ABC,' 2 and for Time-Warner, the
seven cable networks and one radio station (CNN Radio) of Turner
Broadcasting. 26 Thus, CapCities/ABC and Turner are to content what
bookstores are to books. They represent the conduit through which the
product is delivered to the consumer. In this sense, the mergers are
analogous to manufacturers buying up distributors, and thus the mergers
are substantially vertical.
At the same time, Turner also owns a basketball team (Atlanta
Hawks), a baseball team (Atlanta Braves), and a music publisher, as well
as various advertising entities, production companies, and an extensive
film library.'27 Additionally, CapCities/ABC has content and content-

125. See U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIEs, supra note 120, at 314-18. CapCities/ABC also owns the
popular ESPN cable station which is a 24-hour cable sports service and sports programmer. In
addition, CapCities/ABC has 50% ownership, through joint ventures, of the Art & Entertainment
Network and Lifetime Television, two other cable stations. See id. at 315.

126. See id. at 1726-27. For Turner this includes Cable News Network (CNN), Turner
Broadcasting System (TBS), Turner Network Television (TNT), SuperStation, Inc., and CNN
Headline News. See id.
127. See id. Obviously, owning two major sports teams represents valuable content for Turner's
television and radio outlets. Moreover, Turner owns Hanna-Barbara Productions, a producer of
animated shows and holder of a vast film library of animated shows and its characters. Turner also

owns New Line Cinema Corporation, a producer and distributor of motion pictures. See Id.
Additionally, Turner owns an extensive film library which it bought from MGM in 1986 for over
$1 billion, which includes 3,000 titles from Warner Brothers and RKO, such as "Gone With the
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producing holdings, such as ABC Productions, which create and produce
series and movies for television.

The content offered by Disney and Time-Warner includes each
company's extensive film libraries, studio production facilities, and
current on-going productions. 2 Although there are other sources for
content, none have resources comparable to Disney and TimeWarner.'29 Also, both Disney and Time-Warner have various outlet
holdings which make the mergers horizontal in some of those respects as
well. 30 Additionally, it is not reassuring to see that the "outlet"

Wind" and "Citizen Kane." See Michael Williams & Rex Weiner, Gearing Up for MGM Sale,
DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 6, 1995, at I. Part of this billion dollar deal was the 850 Warner Brothers
movies made before 1948, including various cartoons produced between 1936 and 1948. See Phil
Kloer, Time Warner Turner on TV, ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Sept. 23, 1995, at 3B. Finally, Turner
owns Castle Rock Entertainment (which produces, among other things, the top-five television show
"Seinfeld"). For a good chronology of Turner Broadcasting's rise, see Creating an Entertainment
Giant; Turner's Long History with Time Warner, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, at D5.
To the extent that Turner already owned so much content and so many content-producing
companies, the merger with Time-Wamer was also seen clearly as a horizontal affair.
128. As for Disney, it owns two motion picture production companies, a television film
production company, two home video manufacturers, two music production companies, and an
engineering and development company (for shows and rides). See U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES, supra
note 120, at 528-29. Disney also owns two professional sports teams, the Mighty Ducks (hockey)
and the California Angels (baseball). See Matt Lait & Greg Hernandez, Disney Teams with Angels,
L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1995, at A26. Perhaps the only thing preventing Disney and Turner from
owning professional football teams is the National Football League's rule prohibiting corporate
ownership of teams. See id.
As for Time-Wamer, it owns a motion picture production and distribution company, six
music recording companies (including Warner, Atlantic, and Elektra), three television production
companies, a video production company, a cable production company (HBO), a video game and
software producer, a non-music audio production company (for books on tape), and seven book
publishers (including Little, Brown & Co.). See U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES, supra note 120, at 168690.

129. Disney and Time-Wamer own major film production studios, capable of producing both
motion pictures and television shows. See sources cited supra note 128.
130. For Disney these include a cable television network (The Disney Channel), two radio
stations, a magazine (Discover), and a television station (KCAL-TV, Hollywood, CA). See U.S.
PUBLIC COMPANIES, supra note 120, at 529. However, as a condition of federal approval of the

merger of Disney and CapCities/ABC, Disney agreed to sell its television station, KCAL. See Jube
Shiver, Jr. & Sallie Hofineister, JusticeApproves Disney-CapCitiesDeal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996,
at D2.

An important outlet feature of Disney is its theme parks in Los Angeles, Orlando, France,
and Japan. Each theme park capitalizes on the cult-popularity of the Disney content productions,
such as "Aladdin," "Pocahantas," and "The Lion King." Time-Warner accomplishes the same effect,
to a lesser degree, through operation of its Six Flags Corporation which has theme parks in
California, Texas (2), New Jersey, Illinois, Georgia, and Missouri. The Six Flags theme parks
showcase various Warner Brothers cartoon characters and promote Warner Brothers movies, such
as "Batman" by introducing a "Batman" roller coaster.
Again, Time-Warner owns twenty-three pay cable operations/stations, a cable network
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companies in these mergers (CapCities/ABC and Turner Broadcasting)
have shored up various other sources of content, including the "first
look" deal that CapCities/ABC made with Jim Henson Productions. 3 '
In fact, the market share that Disney-ABC, Time-Turner, and

Westinghouse-CBS will command in the various industries will be
tremendous. First, for the film industry, based on figures from 1991 to
1992, Time-Turner's market share will increase from 17.9% to
21.9%132 This occurs while the share for smaller independent firms,
not among the top nine studios, decreases from 10.1% to 1.5% during the
same period.'33 Additionally, in the aftermarket for films, VHS home

video, Time-Warner will increase its share in that market from 14.0% to
17.0%, while Disney will be unaffected due to the merger, but still

maintain a major market share of 21 .0%.134 Second, the television

(HBO), fifteen magazines (including Time, People, Money, Life, Fortune, and Sports Illustrated), two
home video producers, a printing and packaging company for records, and seven book publishers.
See U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES, supranote 120, at 1686-90. In fact, Time-Warner is the second largest
cable television provider, providing 26.2% of the cable television outlet. See MARKET SHARE
REPoRTER 328 (Arsen J. Damay & Marlita A. Reddy eds., 1995) (citing Mark Robichaux, Dolan
Holds Courtfor Suitors of Cablevision Systems, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1993, at B4).
It is important to note that often a certain facet of the industry can be either a content
producer or outlet or both. For example, book publishers are an outlet to the extent that they use
characters or events first created in another production part of the company, such as when a book
rendition of a movie is made after the movie is first released in film form. Contrary to this, books
represent content to the extent that the books themselves create the characters or events that are later
translated into another form.
What is crucially important to this Note's analysis is the increasing tendency for industries
to in fact overlap, even in areas where traditionally this was not the case. For instance, film star Jim
Carrey's character from "The Mask" has been translated into an animated cartoon for Saturday
morning television. This overlap or cross-industry use of inputs is critical to antitrust analysis to the
extent that it creates barriers to entry for potential market competitors, while at the same time
generating an efficiency justification for the mergers.
131. See Lawrie Mifflin, ABC in Pact with Henson Productions,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1995,
at D7. Although Jim Henson Productions claims to intend to create programs for other television networks; the "first look" status of the five-year deal brings into question the other outlets' ability to
compete effectively. See id. Also, considering that HBO and Nickelodeon are owned by TimeTurner, not only does Disney-ABC have a great incentive to comer the market on the Henson
productions, but the ability of other outlets, including the emerging networks of Fox, UPN, and other
smaller cable and satellite outlets, to compete is doubtful at best. See generally Daniel Howard
Cerone, Company Town: Disney's Mega-Merger,L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1995, at DI (noting the $100
million programming deal CapCities/ABC has with the potential mega-content producer, SKG
DreamWorks).
132. See MARKET SHARE REPORTER, supranote 130, at 487 (citing Marcy Magiera, In Movies,
Warner Hot, ParamountNot, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 29, 1993, at 20).
133. See Magiera, supra note 132, at 20. This figure is indicative of the growing inability of
the smaller independent firms to compete against the ever growing larger integrated finms.
134. See MARKET SHARE REPORTER, supra note 130, at 487.
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industry, which has traditionally been concentrated, will maintain
dominance over television advertising dollars despite the emergence of
cable and satellite television. 3S In regard to the cable industry, the
merger of Time-Warner and Turner represents a merger of the second
and third largest revenue makers in the industry. 36 Third, for the radio
industry, Westinghouse's combination with CBS will increase its share
amongst top radio broadcasting groups from 12.8% to 32.1% in
1993,137 while Disney-ABC emerges as the third largest revenueproducing radio conglomerate with its twenty-one stations. 38
This market share data is important for various reasons. First, under
a traditional anticompetitive analysis market share is relevant.'3 9
Second, and more important to the question of the legality of vertical
mergers, market share is relevant to the ability of the merged company
to be self-sufficient at more than one level of production or in more than
one connected industry. 4 ' As a result of having market power in
industries that overlap to a great extent, these merged companies will not
only be self-reliant but will be able to use their vertical integration in one
industry to influence its content and how that content is used in other
industries.14 '

135. Also, to the extent that network broadcasters see their total industry output decrease with
the proliferation of cable and satellite television, their incentive to operate on larger economies of
scale should decrease, not increase, based on fundamental economic reasoning. See BAIN, supranote
1, at 166-80.
136. See MARKET SHARE REPORTER, supra note 130, at 328.
137. See id. at 323. Westinghouse-CBS had the most radio advertising revenue in 1994, with
its 39 stations. See Sweeping Legislation Changes Media Landscape,STANDARD & POOR'S INDUS.
SURVEY: MEDIA CURRENT ANALYSIS, Mar. 14, 1996, at MS.
138. See id.
139. The substantiality of the relevant market comprising the industry and the company's share
of that market are both important to the courts' analysis. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95 (1957).
Also, the 1984 Merger Guidelines, see supranote 19, indicate that market share is relevant
to antitrust enforcement. For a thorough discussion of the application of the 1984 Merger Guidelines,
see Ansell, Inc. v. Schmid Laboratories,Inc., 757 F. Supp. 467, 475 (D.N.J. 1991). Assuming the
geographic market is the entire nation for many of the products at issue with these entertainment
mergers, i.e., movies and national television broadcasts, the ultimate HHI figures will depend on the
court's determination of what the product market is for the respective vertically merged firms. The
more narrowly the product market is defined, the more likely a court will find the merger offensive
under the HHI analysis.
140. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.
141. See infra note 142. Additionally, because the bargaining power of these large, vertically
integrated firms is so tremendous, they have the unique ability to influence various input and outlet
options. See, e.g., Shiver & Hofineister, supra note 130, at D2 (noting that Disney would likely
make its sale of the television station KCAL conditional on the new owner's airing games of the two
professional sports teams owned by Disney, the Mighty Ducks and the Angels).
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To illustrate, Disney-ABC may require use of one of its stars in a
movie script by an independent writer and, perhaps, also require a partand-parcel syndication agreement for distribution of the movie on
ABC.142 At first glance this may not seem important. One might say
that one network is as good as the next, but the relevance of this
exclusive dealing arrangement is twofold.'43 First, the independent
writer will not be able to auction his product for what it is worth to
ABC, NBC, CBS, Fox, or other buyers, as he otherwise would if there
was no Disney-ABC marriage. Absent the merger of Disney-ABC, if the
writer's film is successful, he would presumably reap justifiably higher
142. Such contracts tying theatrical rights to distribution rights are common in the entertainment
industry. Moreover, these types of one-sided contracts, favoring the large entertainment company,
have been approved as part of industry custom by courts in two important entertainment states. First,
in New York, in Premingerv. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, affd, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913,
aff'd, 219 N.E.2d 431 (1966), the artist, a producer and director, sold the distribution rights to his
film, including television rights, to Columbia. See id. at 596. Despite the fact that the artist expressly
reserved the right of final approval for editing the film, see id. at 598, the court denied injunctive
relief to the artist, see id., and gave the television station the right "to eliminate portions of the
picture, and to interrupt [for] commercials." Id. at 596. The court held that the artist's contractual
rights only applied to the theatrical release. See id. at 598. The court said that in order to overcome
the industry custom for allowing editing for television, the artist would have to use specific language
to that effect in the contract. See id.
Second, in California, in Stevens v. NationalBroadcasting Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Ct. App.
1969), the artist, a filmmaker, reserved contractually "the right to edit, cut and score" the film. Id.
at 108. Yet the court denied injunctive relief in ruling in favor of NBC and the other defendant,
Paramount, despite the fact that the artist claimed, that as a licensee, he had the right to modify the
film when it was distributed. See id. at 108. The court held that changes made for purposes of
distribution were not protected in the artist's contract. See id. at 109. For a more detailed discussion
of these two cases, see Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture Colorization,Authenticity, and the
Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 660-61 (1989). See also Karen L. Gulick, Creative
Control, Attribution, and the Need for Disclosure: A Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture
Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 56 (1994) (noting that "most motion picture artists-directors,
screenwriters, and cinematographers-retain no legal control over the commercial exploitation of
their work").
143. Whether this exclusive dealing contract is valid under the rule of reason is debatable. See
SCHERER, supra note 2, at 590. While courts have not tackled this question specifically, case law
has been willing to validate similar types of exclusive contracts between suppliers of programming
and distributors. See, e.g., Ralph C. Wilson Indus. v. Chronicle Broad. Co., 794 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.
1986) (approving exclusive distributorships of programming in the television industry under a rule
of reason analysis); Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision,
Inc., 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that television programming is a service and therefore
does not fall under the § 3 Clayton Act proscription of discrimination among distributors).
Similar exclusionary efforts in the entertainment industry found little dissuasion from the
courts where the sale of programming by large carriers was discriminatory toward smaller local
competitors. See, e.g., Sunbelt Television, Inc. v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 333 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (dismissing claim by television broadcast station that cable television system was
monopolizing); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that
claim of monopolization was insufficient).
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bids for the television rights to his film. 44 In this way, the vertical
integration of Disney-ABC has harmed writers.
Second, it is not difficult to imagine that if vertically integrated
firms like Disney-ABC, Time-Turner, and Westinghouse-CBS all prefer
to televise content from writers with whom they have exclusive contracts
in the film industry, then the marginal program offerings will deteriorate
4
as independent writers with slightly superior content are passed over.1 1
This is not to say that the clearly superior content producers will be shutout of all programming options, but it is clear there will be a greater
decline in the marginal quality of programming with the proliferation of
vertical mergers.146 Additionally, this conclusion is not limited to the
script-writing industry, but can apply to various overlapping industries
within the vertically merged companies.

144. In this regard the consumer's welfare is not affected because the consumer would always
have the choice to view the writers work since ABC is accessible to everyone who has a television.
See Chronicle Broad., 794 F.2d at 1364 (validating exclusivity agreements where there is no
showing that "program offerings are detrimentally affected").
Also, Disney-ABC could assert efficiencies in advertising the writer's product and preventing
"free-riding" by other television outlets if, for example, without the exclusivity agreement, the writer
sold television rights to a company other than ABC, after all the promotional work was done by
Disney-ABC for the film. See Riordan & Salop, supranote 46, at 524-25 (discussing the elimination
of free-riding through vertical integration); David J. Saylor, ProgrammingAccess and Other
Competition Regulations of the New Cable Television Law and the PrimestarDecrees:A Guided
Tour Through the Maze, 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321,328 (1994); see also BAIN, supranote
1, at 202-04 (explaining how increased concentration is prompted by a desire to more efficiently
promote the product).
145. To be viewed as an invalid exclusive-dealing arrangement under § 3 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1973), the complaining party would have to show "program offerings [were]
detrimentally affected." ChronicleBroad., 794 F.2d at 1364. Proving this would be difficult enough,
but even more challenging would be the requirements likely needed to show cartel-action on the part
of the defendants as well as resulting injuries. See id. The plaintiff in Chronicle Broad. was a
distributor, or outlet company, that failed to prove injury. See id. Such a showing would presumably
be more difficult for the other types of groups potentially affected by the lower quality programming,
namely, viewers and advertisers. Viewers "consume" television shows, and their price is having to
view, presumably, the commercials as well. Advertisers are customers of the distribution companies.
146. Those in the entertainment industry have not been shy about admitting that vertically
merged companies would prefer their own content:
If you're going to put on 10 new shows in a given year, let's say you think four are
great. You will buy those four no matter who they're from. The six others fall into
a gray area.... [I]n the gray areas, it will go to Disney from now on .... Most
new shows fail
anyway. You might as well fail with your own, because if you have
a hit it could be your own.
Cerone, supra note 131, at Dl (quoting a former head of Disney's television operations, Richard
Frank). The article goes on to speculate as to other ways the quality of programming could be
marginally damaged, noting that "Disney shows may be favored when it comes to time slot
decisions" for television programming. Id.
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a. Short-Run Impacts of the Mergers
The most immediate impact of any merger is the costs necessary to
effectuate the merger itself. Considering that the legal and business fees
associated with these types of multi-billion dollar deals often run well
into the millions of dollars, this factor should not be discounted.'47 For
Time-Turner these costs included the typically inefficient aspects of
paying big fees "necessary" to consummate big deals, in the form of a
$50 million fee paid to a consultant.'4 8 Additionally, there is the very

real possibility that the mergers will result in complex litigation with
federal agencies such as the FTC, FCC, or DOJ, regarding antitrust and
perhaps other issues. 4 9 Also, mergers of this kind often have contractual safeguards, which amount to a windfall to one of the companies if the
deal is not consummated, for whatever reason.' These costs militate
against any efficiency justifications that may be asserted as part of the
Chicago School justification of vertical mergers, at least in the short-run.
Further, there is a real likelihood that these vertical mergers are a
by-product of the egos of the moguls in the respective firms' and not

147. The estimated merger-related costs to CapCities/ABC totaled $57.3 million, which played
a role in the company's 2.3% drop in profits. See Gary Levin, CapCities' Profits Dip, DAILY
VARImY, Feb. 6, 1996, at 4. The estimated cost for the Time-Turner deal is $10 million. See TBS
Reports Fourth QuarterResults, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 6, 1996, at 1.
148. The consultant was Michael Milken. These attorney's fees and consultant's fees can run
into the tens of millions. See Benjamin J. Stein, Turner Flips a Chip, BARRON's, Oct. 9, 1995, at
32-33 (explaining how Michael Milken received a $50 million fee for consultation regarding the
intended merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner). Additionally, Ted Turner's cut of
the contract included a $125 million five-year compensation plan, placing him among the highest
paid executives in America. See Sallie Hofmeister, Turner Says He May Cut Pay He'd Get in
Merger, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at D2.
149. The Westinghouse-CBS merger cleared FCC approval on November 22, 1995. See
Takeover of CBS Cleared by F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1995, at D4. The Disney-ABC merger
was approved by the FCC on February 8, 1996. See Disney ClearsF.C.C. Review of Its Merger,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996, at D2. The Time-Turner merger is still under governmental review.
In addition to government legal action, these types of mergers typically spawn civil suits,
either by contractual business partners of the merging companies, or by shareholders who feel that
the deal was unfair to them. See Hofmeister, supra note 148, at D2. See generally Judith H.
Dobrzynski, Linking the Cost of an Acquisition to the Acquiring Chiefs Vanity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1995, at D6 (explaining how shareholders are often negatively impacted by mergers).
150. Time-Warner included a termination fee of $190 million in its deal with Turner should the
deal fall through under certain conditions, such as Turner taking a rival offer. See If Turner Deal
Falls Through; Time Could Pocket $190 Million, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1995, at B3.
151. Matthew L. Hayward, a doctoral candidate at Columbia University Business School, coauthored a study with Donald C. Hambrick, a management professor at Columbia University,
concluding that chief executive officers' egos play a more significant role in the unduly high
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motivated by the traditional justifications of vertical integration, such as

a desire to avoid a monopolistic supplier or simply wanting to increase
economies of scale efficiencies.152 One problem with this type of

egomaniacal motivation for concentration through vertical and horizontal
integration is that it becomes contagious in the industry 153 and could
lead to an artificially high level of complexity in production.15 This

contagion and increased complexity (or duplication of production aspects)

premium paid for target companies, more so than any justification of synergy or increasable
efficiencies. See Dobrzynski, supra note 149, at D6 (noting that the study found that "the only
meaningful relationship with the size of the premium is hubris, not synergies or the target's
performance").
152. See SCHERER, supra note 2, at 88-91. These economies of scale include reductions in
"price shopping, the communication of work specifications, and contract negotiation [which] take
time and effort," all of which are reduced, as a result of vertical integration. Id. at 90. See also
BORK, supra note 1, at 227 (listing as goals of vertical integration the cutting of sales and
distribution costs, more effective transmission of marketing possibilities from retailer to manufacturer, better transmission of new product possibilities in the other direction, better inventory control,
better planning of production runs, and creating economies of scale in management).
153. This occurs either out of fear of competitors feeling that they cannot compete without
being proportional to the vertically integrated firm, and/or simply out of the same egomaniacal
motivations that spurred the original merger. The facts support this contagious phenomenon, as the
Disney-ABC, Time-Turner, and Westinghouse-CBS mergers all occurred in rapid fire succession
within the same year, 1995. Contagious effects toward future concentration is a recognized evil by
Congress as seen by the Supreme Court. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,333-34
(1962).
Of course, if there is a contagious effect spreading through an industry, the fact that a
company merges could partially mitigate the evils of the trend in the industry if that company claims
that the "purpose of the arrangement" was to avoid a takeover. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 329. This
type of "white knight" mechanism is a factor favoring the defendant in antitrust analysis under
Brown Shoe. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MERGER TACTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 24-25
(1982). However, there is no evidence that any of the merging parties at issue here were targets,
except for CBS, who was targeted by Turner prior to the Westinghouse merger. See Carol Marie
Cropper, After Spurned Bids, It's Often the Shareholders Who Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at
F3 (reporting Turner offered $5.41 billion for CBS in 1985); Geraldine Fabrikant, How Ted Turner
Plans to Playfor a Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at B1 (remarking on Turner's ten-year
quest to purchase CBS).
154. The increased complexity of production is only fueled by the fact that Time-Turner and
Disney-ABC both vowed not to have significant layoffs due to the mergers, which makes one
immediately question the existence of any economies of scale efficiencies. See Charles Haddad,
Turner: Deal Wouldn't Cost Jobs; MergerNegotiations Continue, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 8,
1995, at IF (discussing Turner's statement that no layoffs would occur after the merger); Robin
Schatz, Anything but Goofy; Disney Becomes Media Behemoth by Buying ABC, NEWSDAY, Aug. 1,
1995, at AS (noting that no layoffs were expected as a result of the Disney-ABC deal).
The ultimate problem in this regard will be the distinct possibility of large layoffs in the
long-run, once the ephemeral promise of synergies completely disappears. The same sequence of
events already unfolded at AT&T, where the company laid off 40,000 people as a by-product of
disintegrating. See Edmund L. Andrews, Job Cuts at AT&T Will Total 40,000, 13% ofIts Staff, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1996, at Al; see also supra notes 14, 135; infra Part II.A.l.b.
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are two more short-term detriments to these types of mergers in the
entertainment industry. The former detriment of contagion can lead
quickly to a situation where even the Chicago School would protest;
namely, where the integration is so extensive as to result in monopolistic
55
powers because of the horizontal aspects of the mergers.
Another short-run impact of vertical mergers in the entertainment
industry is short-run foreclosure. To a certain extent short-run foreclosure
is a mixed bag of uncertainties. To the extent that other companies have
contracts to deal with the merged parties, those contracts will presumably
be honored. Often, however, the inability to honor both the short-run
contract commitments and commitments arising from the merger results
in an issue for litigation.' 56
What is certain is that input and customer foreclosure will occur in
the short-run to the extent that market participants are not protected
contractually. From there, the matter becomes one of assessing the longrun impacts of the merger.
b. Long-Run Impacts of the Mergers
Whether the vertically integrated firm is characterized as "more
efficient" and therefore benign, or as inherently more powerful and
therefore harmful, there is no question that the "trend" toward vertical
integration in the entertainment industry has been contagious and has
resulted in a realignment of market structure that impacts current and
potential market participants.57 The behavior of both current and
potential market participants is crucial to the judicial antitrust analysis. 58 Disney's situation juxtaposed to the networks is very similar to
the position Ford maintained juxtaposed to the spark plug industry in
FordMotor. Clearly, Disney is no longer a potential market entrant into
network broadcasting, as it was before the merger with CapCities/ABC. 159
Thus, Disney, now merged with CapCities/ABC, no longer places any

155. See BORK, supra note 1, at 238.
156. For example, U.S. West brought suit against Time-Warner after the Time-Turner deal,
claiming that the deal violated U.S. West's partnership agreement with Turner. See Eben Shapiro,
For Time Warner, ContinentalDeal Complicates Its Stormy US West Ties, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,
1996, at B3.
157. This "trend" has been far more pervasive than the trend recognized in Brown Shoe. See
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 301.

158. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 567-68 (1972).
159. See generally Brian Lowry, Frankto Steer Disney onto Infopike, VARIETY, Aug. 29, 1994,
at 53 (discussing Disney's reasoning behind wanting to obtain a network).
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significant check on60 the quality and pricing behaviors of existing
broadcast networks.

As a result, the quality and pricing of the oligopolistic' 6' network
market becomes even less competitive. In this way, the "check" that

would have been performed by Disney against ABC, NBC, CBS, and
Fox is the same type of utility that is at the roots of the competitive

process. The unknown information--here, whether or not Disney will
enter the network market on its own--exists to a greater degree with a
larger number of market participants. This is a key distinction between
internal growth and external growth through integration. 62 The repercussion is that overall quality in the industry diminishes in the long-run
as companies become more satisfied with resting on internal laurels. No
longer is there a fierce competition for creating the innovative and
exciting product that could be auctioned to numerous buyers. The
practical result of the vertical integration is that the number of buyers has
been decreased. 6 Thus, the consequence reflects a basic premise of

antitrust law:
a reduction of competition leads to a decrease in consumer
64
welfare.

The lessening of market participants on various levels of production
and distribution can have lasting long-run effects. These can include a
greater tendency toward collusion,6 6 a requirement of "two-tiered"
entry into the market,"6 increased sophistication among market partici1 68
pants," and input and customer foreclosure.

160. This is similar to Ford's "removing one of the existing restraints upon the actions of those
in the business of manufacturing spark plugs" as a result of its merger. FordMotor, 405 U.S. at 568.
161. Most of the industries involved in these mergers are oligopolistic in character. See BAIN,
supra note 1, at 182-89.
162. But see BORK, supra note 1, at 226-28.
163. This will not prevent the most innovative and impressive production companies from being
able to sell their product, but it certainly will lower the price which they can command, and the
marginally superior product will lose out to the "in-house" product of slightly less quality. See supra
note 146 and accompanying text.
164. "Like the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 1950
Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping
a large number of small competitors in business." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
275 (1966); see also supra note 101.
165. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 557.
166. See Adams & Brock, supra note 49, at 306.
167. On the surface this would not appear to be a negative consequence. However, through the
sophisticated buyer defense, such increased sophistication-presumably gained through a greater
concentration of intelligence in market participants-leads to more and more"justified" concentration
in the market, through vertical integration. See discussion supra Part I.D.1.
168. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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Despite the fact that courts are concerned with both potential market
entrants and existing market entrants, it is clear that those already in the
market certainly have a better opportunity to compete with the vertically
integrated firm by simply integrating as well. The firm already in the
market would have less expansion costs than an entrant would have
entrance costs. In fact, the sunk costs to entry, where a new entrant must
enter on two- or three-tiered levels, is a significant deterrent of such
entry. For instance, there is no question that it would be less risky to
enter an industry creating and selling animated films, than attempting to
create animated films and establish a distribution network, spanning the
different medians, for the films. 6 9
For example, companies such as UPN (Paramount's fledgling new
station aspiring for network status) have a tougher road ahead today as
opposed to the job which Fox was able to accomplish, when it broke into
the network business to compete against the "big three" less than a
decade ago. Arguably, the network market and quality has increased
since Fox entered and such quality improvement would continue if
barriers to entry did not exist. 70 Whatever the case, it is clear from a
market analysis that the ability of "non-big three" outlets to quickly
capture 25% of the market in the 1986-87 television season-prior to
Fox gaining network status-is a good indicator that the "big three" were
not producing such quality programming from which viewers were
reluctant to switch. 71 However, regardless of how quality programming
is achieved, it is clear that once it is achieved, the consumer will be
better off in two ways. First, because more people will watch the more

169. Bork insists that the amount of vertical integration through merger is irrelevant. See BORK,
supra note 1, at 227-28. Only the amount of efficiency that is achieved at each level of production
or distribution is relevant to whether others will be able to enter and compete. See id. at 227.
Presumably Bork would conclude that short of predatory actions (which would be checked by

antitrust enforcers anyway), and assuming that there are no superior efficiencies gained through
integration, any entity could enter the industry at any level of integration and compete effectively.

170. Some had argued that the market could not maintain more than four networks. However,
since then, UPN and the WB Network have emerged to bring the total to six. Whether this is the

ceiling or not is debatable. See Bill Carter, Networks' Gains Mask Some Basic Weaknesses, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at C4 (commenting on the emergence of two new television companies in 1995,

and concluding that "at least one existing network, CBS, saw its position erode" as a result of people
switching to the new networks and cable programming); Lowry, supra note 159, at 53 (discussing
WB's viability as a fifth network).
171. See Radio & TVBroadcasting: Big 3 Audience Shares Continues to Erode, STANDARD &
POOR'S INDUS. SURVEYS, July 20, 1995, at M38 (noting that the "big three's" share has declined

from 91% in the 1978-79 season, to 61% in the 1993-94 season); see also Carter, supra note 170.
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creative programming, the need for more commercial time will decrease 172 as a higher premium is warranted for the innovative programming. Second, consumers will benefit from the very fact that the

programming is superior as a result of competitive forces.
Another long-run detriment of the merger between media entities,
where one of them is involved in news media-like CNN, CBS, and
ABC-is the ability to be objective toward the numerous business
aspects of the parent company.173 As the number of vertical integrations grows in this industry, the ultimate harm to the consumer is the
reduction in the dissemination of news.
Another important point is a question of timing. Often the trend in
industries toward mergers results in multiple deals occurring in rapid
succession, which is what occurred in the entertainment industry in
1995.174 The question then becomes whether antitrust law should
intervene to delay or prevent a merger or simply do nothing and wait and
see if the possible long-term detriments develop.17 5
There is no doubt that efficiencies are a possible reality of vertical
integration. The question is how the efficiencies, and other possible
benefits, should be measured against the other detriments and the shortand long-run effects of the merger. Each of these three mergers has been
justified citing increased efficiencies for each entity that will allow each

172. It should be noted that the amount of airtime given over to commercials "continued its
record-breaking rise in 1994." Radio & TV Broadcasting: Commercial Clutter Grows, STANDARD
& POOR'S INDUS. SURvEYS, July 20, 1995, at M38.
173. See Ed Bark, Deal PutsABC in Prickly Spot, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1995, at
IC (discussing the ability of one of ABC's movie critics to continue to objectively critique Disney
movies); Small World News, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at 18A (questioning whether the
Disney-owned Kansas City Star will criticize Disney films, or whether CBS News will expose
Westinghouse for ruining the environment). This detriment could materialize in the short-run as the
consumer loses one outlet of information about certain news stories. For example, ABC's popular
news show "Nightline" failed to even mention the Disney-ABC merger the night the news broke.
See Bark, supra, at IC.
174. See supra note 153. There are different opinions as to what the "trend" toward vertical
integration means. This "trend" toward vertical integration was an important factor in the Court's
analysis in Brown Shoe, militating against the defendant businesses. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 332-33 (1962). However, "trend" is an unimportant novelty to Chicago School
analysts. See BORK, supra note 1, at 227 (referring to trends in vertical integration as "merely the
responses of businessmen to changing circumstances").
In light of the tendency for entertainment mergers to be a result of hubris on the part of the
respective companies' bosses, and considering the market share proportions of the mergers under
consideration here, it seems clear that the "trend" is troublesome to say the least.
175. For example, AT&T laid off 40,000 employees after determining that synergy and
increased efficiency were not valid justifications for high vertical integration. See Andrews, supra
note 154; Lohr, supra note 14.
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to produce more products at lower input costs, thereby raising consumer

welfare."7 6 Despite this standard Chicago School justification, there

may be other short-run
implications, none of which result in increased
77

consumer welfare.
Moreover, when short- and long-run detrimental effects are
combined with the potential harms identified by post-Chicago theorists,
it becomes clear that the increase in vertical mergers in the entertainment
industry should be carefully assessed, and perhaps should be checked.
Specifically, the short-run detriments as well as the long-run speculative
allocative efficiencies of such combinations"' suggest that each merger
be carefully reviewed. The following hypothetical should help flush out
the possible issues presented by these behemoth mergers.
2. An Animated Hypothetical
Let us suppose that there is a cartoon industry consisting of five
animation companies (Alphy-input,Bety-input, Deity-input, Gammy-input,
and Epsilony-input) that create and produce eighty percent of the
animated shows that appear on television.179 The relevant market 8 '
for cartoons is television broadcasts airing on Saturday momings.' 8 '
There are four major network outlets (WBC-outlet, XBC-outlet, YBCoutlet, and ZBC-outlet), a few minor network outlets, and a few cable

176. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II.A.l.a.
178. See sources cited supra notes 11, 13.
179. One area which might be exploited on the basis of these mergers is the cartoon industry,
which has become an international enterprise. See Joe Flint, New Kids Nets Heat Up Race for
Ratings, VARIETY, Jan. 1, 1996, at 70; Lawrie Mifflin, Can the FlintstonesFly in Fii?,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1995, at Dl.
To a not-so-certain extent this hypothetical is grounded in "real life" concerns. For example,
Warner has a multi-year contract to show cartoons on ABC, but Disney has indicated that it hopes
to use ABC as a Saturday morning showcase for its own programming. See Geraldine Fabrikant, The
Looney Tunes Factor,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at Dl.
180. Determining the relevant market is part of the antitrust analysis. See United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
181. This analysis is confined to Saturday morning cartoons, not just for convenience, but
because under relevant case law such a distinct market is unique enough for separate treatment under
antitrust analysis. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) ("[W]ithin [a]
broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets
for antitrust purposes.") (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 593-95). Of course,
antitrust analysis of these three mergers would assess all "economically significant submarket[s]" as
well. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
The product market is also relevant to the analysis. For a discussion of product market
definition in the entertainment industry, see James L. Seal, Market Definition in Antitrust Litigation
in the Sports and EntertainmentIndustries, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 737 (1993).
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and satellite outlets (Cable-i, Cable-2, Cable-3, Star-4, Star-5, and Star6). In the present year, one of the animation companies, Alphy-input, was
acquired by a network, WBC-outlet, that also owned a cable and satellite
outlet, Cable-1 and Star-4. WBC-outlet timed the acquisition so that it
could immediately begin to air animated programming mostly supplied
by Alphy-input, on one of WBC-outlet's three outlets. WBC-outlet
continues to make short-term contracts to air animated programming
from Epsilony-input.Meanwhile, XBC-outlet, YBC-outlet, and ZBC-outlet
all contract out for their programming which comes from Bety-input,
Deity-input, Gammy-input, and Epsilony-input, in various amounts.
Alphy-input, Bety-input, Deity-input, Gammy-input, and Epsilonyinput are in competition with a number of smaller animation producers
that produce about twenty-percent of the animation output, but because
of their larger resources and lengthy existence in the market, Alphy-input,
Bety-input, Delty-input, Gammy-input, and Epsilony-input are able, on
average, to produce higher quality films that receive premium prices.
Each ofAlphy-input, Bety-input, Delty-input, Gammy-input, and Epsilonyinput compete with these smaller producers for the few outlets which
exist; thus, competition is fierce. Each of XBC-outlet, YBC-outlet, and
ZBC-outlet has the wherewithal to produce its own animation in-house
at a moderate capital expense, as they each produce a portion of their
own television shows, but to date each has deemed it more efficient to
contract out for animated productions. This is primarily based on the fact
that competition is intense among animators, and therefore the price of
contracts is reasonable to the major networks and the quality is high. As
a natural consequence the price is also reasonable to the cable and
satellite outlets. 18
After the merger between WBC-outlet and Alphy-input, XBC-outlet,
YBC-outlet, and ZBC-outlet realize that WBC-outlet is saving advertising
expenses because now it can promote all of Alphy-input's products and
thereby bolster Alphy-input's presence in the market. This bolstering has
resulted in increased ratings for Alphy-input's productions, shown
exclusively on WBC-outlet, and WBC-outlet does not have to worry
about other networks "free-riding" by showing Alphy-input's productions
because of the exclusivity aspect of the arrangement between WBC-outlet
and Alphy-input.8 3
182. For our hypothetical let us assume that despite the probability of the four major networks
having monopsony power, they do not use such power to obtain animated films at lower prices, in
order to avoid the Robinson-Patman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
183. See supra notes 143-44.
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Additionally, WBC-outlet and Aiphy-input are able to better
coordinate Alphy-input's product for WBC-outlet's uses."84 Also, WBCoutlet has the security of knowing that its animated films would be
supplied at marginal cost, even if there was a change in the market price.
An example of this would be if Aiphy-input, Bety-input, Deity-input,
Gammy-input, and Epsilony-input, by virtue of collusion or otherwise,
raised prices above the competitive level. Further, WBC-outlet could
achieve better planning of production by internalizing Aiphy-input's
operations. Along these lines WBC-outlet also created economies of scale
in management by laying off some management at Alphy-input. Finally,
WBC-outlet received a lot of free press from the purchase of a major
animation producer, and WBC-outlet knows that this kind of free
advertising cannot hurt its ratings, especially for animated films.
For all of these reasons, and perhaps out of competitive envy of the
increased prestige of WBC-outlet,181 XBC-outlet and YBC-outlet seek
to purchase their own animation production company, and ZBC-outlet
starts to produce fifty percent of its own animated shows, while still
purchasing the rest from Bety-input, Deity-input, Gammy-input, and
Epsilony-input. XBC-outlet purchases Bety-input and YBC-outlet
purchases Deity-input, leaving Gammy-input and Epsilony-input as the
only major independent animation production companies. ZBC-outlet is
then forced to buy animation from Gammy-input and Epsilony-input, as
well as a larger portion from some smaller independent animators. The
question then becomes: What are the anticompetitive effects of XBCoutlet and YBC-outlet's acquisitions?
a. Under the Chicago School Approach
The immediate and simple Chicago School answer to Gammy-input,
Epsilony-input,and the other smaller animation producers would be that
if their product is competitive with others in the market, it will be
distributed regardless of any vertical integration in the cartoon industry. 86 Thus, presumably Gammy-input and Epsilony-input would face
no foreclosure in the market by virtue of the vertical mergers.
The Chicago School theorists discount the repercussions of Gammyinput and Epsilony-inputbeing displaced from business relationships they

184. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 523-24.
185. See supra note 151.
186. See BORiK, supra note 1, at 236 (averring that the structure of the supplying industry will
be whatever is most efficient for the output industry).
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previously maintained with any of the newly integrated firms. 187 In
another words, if Gammy-input and Epsilony-input are now foreclosed
from selling their product to XBC-outlet and YBC-outlet because of the
mergers, and prior to the mergers they sold fifty percent of their product
to XBC-outlet and YBC-outlet, Gammy-input and Epsilony-input will
simply have to tough it out. Presumably, Gammy-input and Epsilonyinput will be able to pick up where Bety-input and Deity-input left
83
off.
After dismissing all of the potential harms of the vertical merger as
unfounded or insignificant, the Chicago School theorists would highlight
the positive aspects of the mergers: promotion efficiencies, elimination
of free-riding, coordination efficiencies, ensured supply at marginal cost,
more efficient and better planning of production, better economies of
scale in management, and free press. For the Chicago School theorists,
these benefits, stacked up against no, or at most minimal, detrimental
effects, present an impressive record of why antitrust law should avoid
invalidating vertical mergers.
b. Under the Post-Chicago School Approach
The post-Chicago School approach would take a closer look at the
likely effects of these mergers, and thereby address several additional
concerns than were considered by the Chicago School theorists. First, the
post-Chicago School approach pays closer attention to the potential
harms from input and customer foreclosure. Input foreclosure may result
in a greater likelihood of monopsony action on the part of the remaining
animation producers toward the smaller networks, the cable and satellite
outlets, and even toward the unintegrated major network. 9 Another illeffect of input foreclosure would result if Gammy-input, Epsilony-input,
and the remaining smaller animation companies were unable to expand
their production to sell animated films to companies that previously were
customers of Alphy-input, Bety-input, and Deity-input 90 This effect
may exist only in the short-run until new market entrants arrive, or it

187. See id. at 231-32.
188. Bork implies that the transition following the merger is not a serious concern and has no
impact on competition. See id. at 232.
189. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 528-29. The likelihood of this is enhanced by the
exclusive nature of the relationship between WBC-outiet and Alphy-input,XBC-oudet and Bety-input,
and YBC-oudet and Delty-input. In other words, Alphy-input, Bety-input, and Deity-input no longer
produce animated films other than for use by their parent company.

190. See id.
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may endure for a longer period if there is a fear about entering the
increasingly integrated market, perhaps because of the two-tiered nature
of the more successful companies. As a result of customer foreclosure,
Gammy-input and Epsilony-input could have higher unit costs, simply
because they may be forced to sell less as WBC-outlet, XBC-outlet, and
YBC-outlet refuse to buy from them.
Additionally, there is a significantly greater possibility that the
merged animation companies (Alphy-input, Bety-input, and Deity-input)
could benefit from information received by WBC-outlet, XBC-outlet, and
YBC-outlet, if the respective outlet company continues to do business
with any of the remaining animators. This is achieved because of the
19 g
exchange of pricing and other competitively sensitive information.
For example, because WBC-outlet still deals with Epsilony-input, then
WBC-outlet could pass on any sensitive information it obtains to Aiphyinput. Thereafter, Alphy-input could use that information to its advantage
against the other animation producers, if Alphy-input were to compete,
absent any exclusivity arrangement with WBC-outlet.'92
This analysis by the post-Chicago School theorists is geared more
toward the probable action of real market participants. It goes beyond the
most simple, practical assumptions of the Chicago School approach and,
for that reason, involves greater speculation as to probable actions by
market participants. While the analysis is more complex, it is more likely
to result in a realistic picture of the market structure following a trend
toward integration.
As a result, the post-Chicago approach involves a closer look into
the various aspects of the vertical merger, which may result in finding a
violation of antitrust law, despite efficiencies that may exist, and which
would have protected the merger under the Chicago School approach.
However, even if the hypothetical mergers contemplated by XBC-outlet
and YBC-outlet are thought to violate antitrust law under post-Chicago
theorist's "closer look," there are specific features of the entertainment
industry which necessitate an even closer look.
c.

Special Aspects of Analysis for the Entertainment
Industry

Most of the examples describing how economics should influence
federal antitrust enforcement involve generic input and output items. At

191. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
192. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 557-58.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss1/5

44

Cox: What Goes Up Must Come Down: Grounding the Dizzying Height of Ver
1996]

VERTICAL MERGERS

one extreme the analysis may even use the hypothesizer's favorite, the
"widget." But even if the item is not so generic, the example usually
centers around something like shoes or cars. The relatively generic types
of inputs and outputs involved in these industries make price a very key
indicator as to whether an input producer can compete.
However, when it comes to a product that is judged on its ability to
gain ratings approval, for example a cartoon, a much more subjective
evaluation is required which goes beyond the mere question: How much
does it cost? This subjective evaluation is made by the company heads
in the entertainment industry, and while the ratings system brings some
objectivity to the assessment of a cartoon's "worth," there are characteristics unique to the entertainment industry, discussed below, which add
to the subjectivity of the vertically merged corporation's choice of
cartoon.
This is not to say that the quality of input with relatively more
generic goods has no impact on the quality of the output. Rather, the
relationship is exponentially greater when comparing entertainment
output with such items as shoes or cars. Based on this, there is no
certainty that any cartoon producer could compete on the sole criteria of
being able to efficiently produce a quality product, despite Bork's
arguments. 93 In other words, when faced with two inputs of grade "A"
leather, one priced at $100 and the other priced at $105, Chrysler is
unlikely to chose the input costing $105. At the same time, when
presented with cartoons like "The Flintstones," priced at $100, and "The
X-Men," priced at $105, assuming that each had similar approval ratings,
it would not be shocking for an entertainment company to pick the
higher priced cartoon. This is based on the entertainment company's use
of the particular cartoon, which goes beyond televising it on Saturday
mornings.,94
Additionally, there are thousands upon thousands of inputs of
differing quality for the entertainment company to choose. So, unlike the
input for cars-tires, steel, leather, etc.-which is relatively limited, the
input for entertainment industry end-products is extremely diverse. For
example, there may be only a few different qualities of leather, while
there are tens of thousands of actors or singers of differing quality. This
diversity is another problematic factor weighing against vertical mergers
in the entertainment industry because of its tendency to foreclose more

193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 125-30; infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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entertainment inputters that cannot merely rely on being price competitive.
Whereas competition usually dictates that quality inputs at cheap
prices will be available for the downstream firm, when competition is
stunted by merger and the input is diverse, not only will the price of the
input be higher, but there is a greater likelihood that the quality of the
input will decrease. For example, the hypothetical Chrysler-Goodyear
firm will use the raw material of rubber that is relatively homogenous,
and therefore the end-product's quality will not be damaged, even if the
firm uses a lower priced rubber for its tires.
Contrarily, Time-Turner might back a movie just because one of its
stars in the music industry will be the actor. 9 In this case, the quality
of the actor or script could very feasibly be below margin and higher
priced, but because the tail often wags the dog in the entertainment
industry, the movie will be made, and the end-product very easily could
be of low quality. The entertainment industry leader might justify this
lower quality product---and presumably the lower revenue generated from
the movie product--by relying on the entertainer's increased exposure in
the market, leading to greater sales in other products and the entertainer's
increased willingness to promote and produce products for other aspects
1 96
of the vertically integrated entertainment company.
Bork states, "the decision to make oneself or to buy from others is
always made on the basis of difference in cost and effectiveness."' 197 In
other words, a business will always do what is best for the business's
profit, which business is nearest to the consumer.198 This is not the case
in an entertainment industry that is integrated to the extent of the mergers
under discussion here, such that the concern is not always the business
selling to the consumer. Instead, the entertainment industry may be
concerned more with profits on a larger scale, spread throughout the
various integrated output industries. Arguably, Madonna is not the best
actress for the role in "Evita," yet she will get the part in that film

195. See Rawsthom, supra note 14, at 6 (speculating that the main reason Time-Warner backed
the movie "Evita" was because one of their most successful pop stars, Madonna, was interested in
the starring role).

196. Another justification for using a popular star in another industry for an acting role, like the
use of Madonna in "Evita," would be the supposition that he or she has significant "drawing power"
at the box office. In other words, consumers would attend the movie with Madonna in the starring
role, based entirely upon the consumers' loyalty to Madonna as a singer.
197. BORK,supra note 1, at 236.
198. See id.
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because of Warner's ties to both the film and music industries. 199 The

ultimate loser in this process is the consumer because the more this type
of vertical integration proliferates throughout the entertainment industry,
the lower the marginal quality of entertainment will become.
On Bork's behalf, one might assume he would argue that if this is
the case, then ultimately the fully integrated structure of firms will come
tumbling down upon itself, similar to what occurred with AT&T?00
But will it really? What will be the impetus, and how much impetus is
required in an oligopolistic market?0 1 If all firms, or most (i.e., ABC,
Fox, Turner, CBS), are heavily integrated, might the marginal quality
simply drop slightly and the profit remain the same, except that now it
is controlled by fewer, and richer, entrepreneurs?
In part, this conclusion is reached because entertainment, to a degree
unlike other industries, relies heavily on image. "Star" status is important
to any film or television series' success.2 2 As a result of this "star"
factor, while the marginal quality of the entertainment in the individual
industries decreases, the overall profit in the entertainment industry will
increase, as singers appear in movies, movie actors appear in cartoons,
or cartoons appear in primetime.2 3
Consequently, assuming that there are diseconomies of scale at a
certain level in the stream of entertainment commerce (i.e., either in
production or distribution), because of the unique nature of the entertainment industry, an independent producer or distributor cannot simply enter
the market and "beat [the vertically merged company] on costs." 2'
This ability may be feasible with generic type examples such as spark
plugs, but when the input is not generic, the ability to sell the product

199. See supra notes 195-96.
200. See supra notes 154, 175.
201. For a good discussion regarding oligopolistic markets and predictable actions by market
participants therein, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U.
L. REv. 521 (1984).
202. One of the many examples of this phenomenon is the ability of stars from one television
series to parlay their success into a star role in a new series. For example, the character "Fraiser"
went from the very popular show "Cheers" to his own television series entitled "Fraiser." Such a
transition is also possible between different industries.
203. One example of this type of cross-industry promotion is the success that Disney has had
using its animated characters to promote the professional hockey team it owns. See James Flanigan,
Raiders' DepartureHas an Old-FashionedRing to It, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1995, at Dl (noting that

"Mighty Ducks games at the Anaheim Pond are an animation show of Disney characters"); see also
Chris Woodyard, Disney Teams with Angels; A Big League MerchandiserSteps Up to the Plate,
L.A. TioEs, May 19, 1995, at A16 ("Eisner ...plans to cross-market the [Angels] baseball team
with the Mighty Ducks and Disneyland, all within a couple miles of each other in Anaheim").
204. BORK, supra note 1, at 241.
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competitively is questionable at best. Also, because of the tightly
oligopolistic entertainment market, 2°s it is highly improbable that
outsiders will be encouraged to enter the market. This will result in the
long-run foreclosure that is a byproduct of barriers to entry.
That is why it is as critical in the entertainment industry, as it was
in the car and spark plug industry,216 to maintain the viability of
potential market entrants. For example, before the merger with
CapCities/ABC, Disney was a potential entrant into the television market.
Disney could have entered the network market just as Fox, UPN, and
Warner Brothers have.20 7 So the Disney-ABC merger was a barrier to
entry at least to Disney itself.208 On the opposite side, ABC is no
longer a purchaser of other companies' content, in any significant
20 9
way.
Another unique aspect of the entertainment industry is the fact that
consumer preferences are more dominant than in perhaps any other
industry. This preference for the established firms in the market, like
ABC, CBS, and NBC, is an additional barrier to entry that stands in the
way of new entrants 210 and is compounded by the fact that the "depth
of entry"2' 1 is more and more extensive based on the increasing
integration.
Thus, the unique characteristics of the entertainment industry,
namely, (1) non-generic or unique inputs and outputs, (2) the diversity
of input options, (3) the "star" factor, and (4) dominant consumer
preference, each represent additional potential problems with vertical
mergers in the entertainment industry, added to those already noted by
the post-Chicago School analysts.
Therefore, while the answer to the problem posed by the hypothetical cartoon industry, regarding the mergers by XBC-outlet and YBCoutlet, could result in a finding of illegality under the post-Chicago

205. See supra note 161.

206. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566-69 (1972).
207. See supra note 170.
208. See FordMotor, 405 U.S. at 567-68.
209. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 46, at 551.
210. See generally BAIN, supra note 1, at 204-06 (discussing barriers to entry). "(A]ilegiance
of buyers to particular brand names-usually built up by prolonged and persistent persuasive
advertising-and from the dependence of buyers on the 'reputations' of certain sellers" results in
buyer preference. Id. at 205. This is the barrier to entry that ABC and CBS, and to a lesser extent
Turner, enjoys. But see BoRK, supranote 1, at 255 (claiming that "efficiencies ... make entry less
attractive"). This preference is exemplified by the television watcher who flips on his set and
immediately checks what is on ABC, NBC, and CBS before randomly surfing the other channels.
211. In other words, entry is required at two- or three-tiered levels.
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approach (if there was a factual finding of input or customer foreclosure,
exchanges of competitively sensitive information (resulting in an unfair
competitive advantage), or collusion), a more thorough analysis of the
hypothetical is required in light of the unique characteristics discussed
above for mergers in the entertainment industry. The merger of XBCoutlet and YBC-outlet would need to be scrutinized under each of these
additional four factors.
The question thus becomes, in light of these unique characteristics:
What body of antitrust law can federal enforcement agencies rely on to
enjoin such mergers in the entertainment industry? In other words, is a
check currently available to the judiciary so that it can stop the type of
vertical mergers in the entertainment industry which lead to undesirable
market conditions as a result of its unique characteristics? Or, would an
entirely new body of case law need to be developed in order for courts
to properly analyze vertical mergers in industries with non-generic/multiuse inputs, like the entertainment industry?
Ironically, in the midst of the fury of current forward-looking
articles on how to approach vertical mergers in light of the post-Chicago
approach, the answer to our hypothetical can be answered by looking
back. Whether intentionally or not, the two seminal cases in antitrust,
Brown Shoe and FordMotor, provide the keys to how vertical mergers
in the entertainment industry should be analyzed.
B.

The Solution: Harking Back to Some of the Principlesof Brown
Shoe and Ford Motor

The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe made it clear that "[a] most
important... factor" in its analysis of the validity of the vertical merger
was "the economic purpose of the vertical arrangement. ' 212 The Court
wanted to determine if there was "an intention to preserve the 'failing
company.', 21 3 Although the Court did not address whether Brown Shoe
or Kinney had any aspirations for greater efficiencies, the Court was
intent on focusing on the motivations behind the merger.214
Analysis of the above hypothetical cartoon mergers contemplated by
XBC-outlet and YBC-outlet should involve the same type of detailed factfinding as to the real motivations behind the proposed mergers.

212.
213.
214.
president

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).
Id. at 331 (citing International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930)).
See id. at 332 (noting that the past behavior of Brown Shoe Co. and testimony of its
indicated the arrangement would be analogous to a tying arrangement).
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Assessment should be made of the viability of the proposed efficiencies
claimed by the companies. For example, if there is no intention to make
layoffs at the managerial levels, then any claim of increased economies
of scales at that level should be discounted."t Moreover, each claim
of increased efficiency, or of benefits such as free press, should be
balanced against the likely harms of the vertical merger to the market.
The Court in Brown Shoe was very cognizant of the importance of
trends in the market.2" 6 The Court measured the trend over an elevenyear period of acquisitions of retail outlets by manufacturers.2" 7 While
the Court did not emphasize the length of time between these mergers,
it was concerned about what the trend would accomplish if left unchecked."' 8 However, it seems fair to assume that the Court would have
been more concerned with the mergers if they occurred within a short
period of time, presumably because of the Court's inability to judge the
actual effects of the mergers on the market. 9 Also, while a "trend in
[the] industry ... toward oligopoly" was enough to concern the Court in
Brown Shoe,' 0 it should be clear that the trend toward more and more
concentration through vertical integration, in our already oligopolistic
cartoon industry, would concern the Court much more. Thus, the Brown
Shoe Court's concern regarding motivations and trends in the industry
would militate against the validation of the mergers in our hypothetical
cartoon industry."'
The FordMotor Court distinguished between internal growth and
external growth through integration. 2" The distinction is based on the
subtle balance that is silently formed by the inability of the different
market participants to know whether their competitors may at any time
enter the market, if any one of them decides to sell at or near monopo-

215. See supra note 154.
216. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332 ("Another important factor to consider is the trend

toward concentration in the industry.").
217. See id. at 301 (analyzing the number of acquisitions in the industry between 1945 and
1956).
218. See id. at 300-01.

219. Cf. id. at 332-34 (noting that it is the "probableeffects of the merger" which the courts
must consider in its examination of the merger (emphasis added)).
220. Id. at 333.
221. Additionally, the concern over firms' motivations and industry trends would also present
considerable obstacles to other vertical mergers in the entertainment industry because of issues
regarding contagion and ego. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.

222. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 567-68 (1972) (quoting United States
v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 441 (E.D. Mich. 1968)). Bork fails to make this distinction
in his book, The Andtrust Paradox.See BoK, supra note 1, at 226-45.
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listic price levels.m This is the precise benefit that the Ford Motor
Court found in Ford's situation in the context of the oligopolistic spark
plug industry. 4
The Supreme Court in FordMotor noted that if Ford had decided
to enter the aftermarket for spark plug manufacturing by the "internalexpansion route," then "there would have been no illegality."225 The
'2 26
Court also noted that such internal expansion is "not... proscribed.
It is clear why such internal growth is preferred to external growth
through vertical mergers. By entering a market through internal
expansion a company is challenging the ability of the already existing
companies to compete with it. Although the internally-expanding
company may have advantages because it is its own customer, there are
several disadvantages as well.
The internally-expanding company must strive to match the
innovativeness and skill that is wielded by those already viable in the
market. Through this challenge, the internally-expanding company will
either succeed or fail. But in the process there is a chance that it could
offer some innovation to the process. 7 Likewise, there is a distinct
possibility that the new entrant will motivate the already-existing market
competitors to improve, as they fear the added competition of the new
market entrant. This would be the case whether there is a real need to
improve, or just a perceived need. These are all basic principles
indicating why the competitive market works best with the greatest
number of competitors. 2
Considering the market conditions in the cartoon hypothetical, the
principles in Ford Motor could weigh against the mergers proposed by
XBC-outlet and YBC-outlet. Specifically, because there are few market

223. For discussion on a more sophisticated result from the exchange of such competitively
sensitive information, see sources cited supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.

224. See FordMotor, 405 U.S. at 567-68.
225. Id. at 568 (quoting FordMotor, 286 F. Supp. at 441).
226. Id.
227. Perhaps critics of this plan would point out that this trial and error method is inefficient,
but that is not necessarily the case. Also, critics might contend that such "new innovativeness" could
be duplicated internally. However, there is no substitute for the market forces of old-fashioned
competition that were at the roots of antitrust law in the first place. See infra note 229.
228. This is what led the Court in Ford Motor to quote Congressman Celler, of the CellerKefauver bill (1950 amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act): "[T]he worth of the individual is the
worth of the Nation; no more and no less. That which strengthens the individual bolsters the Nation;
that which dwarfs the individual belittles the Nation." Hearing on H.R. 988 et. seq. Before the
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 14-15 (1949) (quoted in Ford

Motor, 405 U.S. at 569 n.5).
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participants in both the input and outlet industries, each individual market
participant would likely pose as a check against any monopolistic
tendencies of input or outlet firms. As long as it is feasible that input
firms would compete in the same industry as outlet firms, and vice versa,
then the mergers contemplated by XBC-outlet and YBC-outlet should be
disallowed-in favor of attempts, such as that made by ZBC-outlet, to
internally expand-so that those outlet firms check the activities of the
input companies."
Thus, both Brown Shoe and FordMotor lend valuable principles to
the analysis of harm to competition that could result in the hypothetical
cartoon industry. These principles should be applied in determining
whether the vertical mergers in the cartoon industry will harm competition, as well as in analyzing the wave of vertical mergers in the
entertainment industry that occurred in 1995.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The post-Chicago School approach, as outlined above,23 ° suggests
more rigorous antitrust scrutiny of vertical mergers. It is likely that more
attacks under this theory will succeed, or at least should succeed.
The extrapolations on the results that would occur based on a postChicago approach to vertical mergers in the entertainment industry are
motivated by the unique characteristics of the industry.2 3' Specifically,
entertainment industry inputs, like works of artists generally, lend
themselves to multiple uses in the entertainment industry, and thereby
create efficiency justifications for vertical mergers in the industry. Thus,
there arises a conundrum: inputs that are non-generic and have multiple
uses (but, are of high quality) are more likely to be excluded from the
market as a result of vertical mergers in the entertainment industry, yet
at the same time non-generic/multi-use inputs (of lower quality) are more
likely to serve firms' efficiency justifications for creating the vertical
mergers in the entertainment industry.

229. Additionally, requiring internal expansion in the entertainment industry decreases the
potential subjective abuses of unique inputs by requiring justifications for use of marginally inferior
inputs, other than those given by the vertically-integrated firm. See supra Part II.A.2.c. Moreover,
the "star" factor becomes less prevalent, at least as far as inter-industry application goes. See supra
notes 203-04 and accompanying text. Finally, forcing firms to internally integrate will provide
smaller firms, like Fox, UPN, and Warner Brothers, the opportunity to chip away at the established
consumer preference. See supranotes 207-09 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
231. See supra Part lI.A.2.c.
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This conundrum brings the goal of efficiency face-to-face with its
old adversary of antitrust law, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
goal of preventing concentration. 232 However, the latter goal should be
given greater deference in the entertainment industry because of the
factors discussed above, regarding the foreclosure of higher quality
inputs. Based on this, and other factors, 233 courts should pay closer
attention to vertical mergers in the entertainment industry.
This ultimate conclusion may be tied to the fundamental concept
that two competitors are better than one when it comes to consumer
welfare, and therefore internal growth is preferable to vertical mergers. 23 4 A refusal to distinguish between internal growth and external
growth through integration-i.e., merger-is at the heart of the Chicago
School's failings.
While the Chicago School theorists concern themselves with
simplistic models that have implicit in them seemingly solid logic to
support their conclusions that vertical mergers have little effect on
competition or price, 235 the models fail to appreciate the complexities
and irrationalities of big business in the United States. As a result, a
court's failure to apply a more detailed case-by-case analysis affects
workers who are the victims of "efficiency layoffs," such as the "buildup" efficiencies that occur when redundant positions at vertically merged
companies are eliminated, or the "break-up" efficiencies sought after by
AT&T.2 36 But, moreover, the court's more limited analysis ultimately
affects the quality of content, when the abilities of independent content
producers to compete are foreclosed by vertical mergers in the entertainment industry.
PatrickM Cox

232. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Arguably, this decrease in concentration could
lead to the "freedom of opportunity" which allows "individuals ...to choose whatever trade or
profession they prefer, limited only by their own talent and skill and by their ability to raise the
(presumably modest) amount of capital required." SCHRER, supra note 2, at 13.
233. See discussion supra Part II.A.l.a-b.
234. See Diesenhaus, supra note 101, at 2075 (discussing how legislative history of the 1950

§ 7 amendments implies a preference for internal growth over merger growth).
235. See BORK,supra note 1, at 229-30.
236. See Andrews, supra note 154.
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APPENDIX

Year.

1970

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

No.of Mergers & Acquisitions

5,152

1,889

2,395

2,346

2,533

2,543

3,001

3,336

16.4

44.3

82.5

53.8

73.1

122.2

179.8

173.1

10

94

113

116

138

200

270

346

Billions of Dollars
$100 million-plus deals, No.

Source: 1989 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMRCE,STATISTICAL ABsmAcT oF Tm UNrrm STATES 530. These
figures include both vertical and horizontal mergers.
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